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The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests:
A Transactional Approach
By ROBERT S. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses many issues involved in the sale of horses
and horse interests.' The term "transactional approach" is bor-
rowed from David Lester's original article on security interests,
2
but is used in a different sense. Unlike topics related to encum-
brances, the usual sales issues do not conveniently group themselves
like the several typical debtor-creditor relationships. While there
are unique problems involved in agister's liens and possessory
security interests, the interesting problems of sales cut across dis-
crete boundaries. Thus, the concepts of reliance, notice, and con-
scionability characterize the problems presented by the behavior of
buyers and sellers-whether the issue before the court is one of
contract-formation or warranty or agency. This Article attempts,
therefore, to draw attention to the shared characteristics of com-
mon transactions. This approach allows litigators or contract-mak-
ers to plan their client's course of action for a particular business
transaction, or for a transaction that has fallen apart.
* Partner in the law firm of Miller, Griffin & Marks, P.S.C., Lexington, Kentucky.
B.A. 1960, Haverford College; 1960-61, Oxford University; LL.B. 1964, Harvard University.
I This Article does not presume to be exhaustive. It excludes, for example, any
serious discussion of the security interests granted in connection with most horse purchases,
a subject covered in detail elsewhere in this symposium. See Lester, The Priority Race:
Winner Takes the Horse, 78 Ky. L.J. 615 (1989-90). Among the other obvious exclusions
are the tax effects of sales, and application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods. Even among the areas discussed, the basis of the
selection here is limiting: it attempts to focus on the issues that typically arise in the sales
of horses, as reflected in the author's experience-and in reported cases. To a substantial
degree, important subjects in the areas discussed here have been analyzed in great detail in
prior symposia in the Kentucky Law Journal (Journal); and those are cited appropriately,
and used as a point of reference for this Article. Reference is also made to lectures collected
by the University of Kentucky's annual equine law seminar, which to some degree produced
the seminal analysis for this approach.
2 See Lester, Secured Interests in Thoroughbred and Standardbred Horses: A Trans-
actional Approach, 70 KY. L.J. 1065 (1981-82).
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The Article is divided into three sections. The first section leads
the reader through typical contracting and conveying issues that
arise across the spectrum of horse sales. The second section ana-
lyzes issues that arise in a business that typically is conducted by
agents for buyers and sellers, including at the venue of the agent-
auctioneer. The final section focuses on the predominant problem
for the owners of one of nature's most fragile assets: the breeding,
racing, and performing qualities of the equine animal.
The author has participated in transactions only in the thor-
oughbred, standardbred, and Arabian businesses; thus an impor-
tant caveat is that these materials need to be used with the
appropriate sensitivity for the practices and needs of particular
horse industries. Nonetheless, horses of all breeds have more in
common than in contrast. Almost without exception, the same
common law and statutes (particularly the Uniform Commercial
Code) were developed and apply to automobiles and horses alike;
but no article about cars would select its topics, nor its organiza-
tion, like this one.
I. SoME GENERAL PRINCn'LES
A. Goods and the Type of Goods
It is well settled that horses are "goods" under the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), and the general principles of U.C.C.
article two are ordinarily the starting point for a discussion of the
sale of horses and interests in horses. 3 Once removed beyond the
whole live animal, however, the classification becomes more inter-
esting. U.C.C. section 2-105 includes "the unborn young of ani-
See Cohan, The Uniform Commercial Code as Applied to Implied Warranties and
"Merchantability" and "Fitness" in the Sale of Horses, 73 KY. L.J. 665 (1984-85) and the
cases cited in footnote thirteen of that article. See also In re Rex Group, Inc. v. Amvest
Funding Co., 80 Bankr. 774, 783 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987) ("[H]orses classified as equipment
that are mobile goods."); Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406 (D.Vt. 1986) (U.C.C.
provisions apply to the sale of stallions); Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (U.C.C. applicable to sale of a mare);
Grandi v. LeSage, 399 P.2d 285 (N.M. 1965); Kropp, Landen, & Donath, The Prevention
and Treatment of Breeding Contract Controversies, 74 Ky. L.J. 715, 718 (1985-86); Note,
Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton: A Caveat to the Horse Trader, 74 Ky. L.J. 889, 890 n.7 (1985-
86); Kropp & Landen, Sale and Other Exchanges of Horses, Seasons and Other Equine
Interests, A3NuAL EQUINE LAW SEMINAR, Univ. of Ky. (1988). But a horse is held not to
be a "product" for strict liability purposes. See Kaplan v. C Lazy U. Ranch, 615 F. Supp.
234 (D. Colo. 1985).
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mals." These are "future goods," subject to special treatment as
to title and insurable interest.4 A cattle case suggests that the sale
of sperm is the sale of goods; 5 but Kwik-Lok Corp. v.Puls6
indicates that a mere sale of breeding rights, when the sperm is
inside a stallion, does not amount to a sale of goods. 7 Therefore,
the Washington court in Kwik-Lok held that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code does not apply in this situation at all-a non sequitur
of great proportions."
On the other hand, In re Blankenship-Cooper9 adopted the
view of an unreported intermediate appellate court opinion in
Kentucky, 10 that the sale of an undivided one-fortieth (1/40th)
fractional interest in a stallion (which by contract was nothing but
a series of annual breeding rights and seldom-used rights to vote
to move the stallion) is equivalent to a sale of goods. In re Blan-
kenship-Cooper also adopts the view that the sale of a single
breeding right (a nomination or season) is not the same as a sale
of goods, which raises a host of problems for secured lenders-
problems that are beyond the scope of this Article. That result is
by no means inevitable; there is authority under the Uniform
Commercial Code of Illinois for establishing a classification of
whether the particular asset is an "interest in" the underlying
property in accordance with its traditional classification." The
Illinois court was required to determine whether a right to trust
income for a time was an interest in the real estate that was the
subject of the trust, or whether it was merely a general intangible-
and thus governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. By analogy,
the holding of this case indicates that if it is reasonable to consider
a season as an interest in the stallion (stallions are considered to
be goods), then the season itself should be considered to be goods.
In the area of taxation, the same analysis can be undertaken
to determine whether the taxpayer is an owner of an asset, de-
, U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (1988).
Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle Breeders LTD. v. Y-Tex Corp., 590 P.2d 1306, 1309 n.6,
7 (Wyo. 1979).
6 702 P.2d 1226 (Wash. App. 1985).
Id. at 1228 n.1.
I See J.S. McHugh, Inc. v. Capolino, 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 35 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977).
9 43 Bankr. 231 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).
10 North Ridge Farms v. Trimble, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1280 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983). The Supreme Court of Kentucky agreed that the share was good, but was silent
as to the breeding right. Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Ky. 700 S.W.2d 396 (1985).
1I Levine v. Pascal, 236 N.E.2d 425 (Il. App. Ct. 1968).
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pending on whether he or she has an interest in it.12 There would,
of course, be some point at which the partial interest would be so
insignificant that it would not be truly an interest in the goods. If
the syndicate manager allowed a child to have a horseback ride,
there would be no interest conveyed in the stallion.
The loss of U.C.C. coverage by the subdivision of rights in
horses creates problems in the sale of horses and interests in horses.
For example, in a contract for the sale of a nomination to a
stallion, where the horse dies-and the contract is silent on the
contingency of death-the result would differ depending on whether
the transaction is considered to be (a) a completed sale of a
property interest (as goods), or (b) the right to take one's mare to
a stallion to be serviced (not goods). While not focusing on this
issue, the result of Green v. McGrath3 was implicitly determined
on the basis of such a distinction. The court in Green understood
(but did not acknowledge) that the sale of a nomination was
complete for risk of loss purposes when it was made,14 a sale under
which there was no guarantee that a live foal would be born-or
even that the breeding would occur. The general doctrine of con-
tract law, to the effect that a contract is to be rescinded and the
purchase price returned when performance under the contract be-
comes impossible,15 is inapplicable where a completed sale has
taken place.1
6
It is possible that a standard foal sharing agreement 17 involves
the transfer of some sort of interest in the stallion to the owner of
the mare, and in the mare to the owner of the stallion. The
12 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) held that an assigned right to receive
trust income for a very short time "was a present property ... like any other"; and thus
the assignee of that "interest" was an owner of an equitable interest in the corpus. Id. at
13. Guggenheim v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 559 (1966) the classic application of tax law to
shares, does not reach this more difficult question. A related sales tax question in Kentucky
has been briefed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The trial court in Calumet Farm v.
Revenue Cabinet, Fayette Circuit Court action 87-CI-3435, held that a lifetime breeding
right in an otherwise undivided stallion (Alydar) is a season and not a share for sales tax
purposes.
, 662 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
See U.C.C. 2-509(2) (1988).
' With perfect consistency, the Code deals with the impossibility defense in U.C.C.
§ 2-615 only as a pre-delivery matter. See 4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-615:26-39 (3d ed. 1983).
16 A similar distinction exists in the law of bailment, which is applied in the horse
case of Gould v. Holwitz, 113 A. 323 (N.J. 1921).
'1 These are described in Miller, America Singing: The Role of Custom and Usage in
the Thoroughbred Horse Business, 74 Ky. L.J. 781, 786 (1985-86).
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classification of such interests will be developed by the courts
•largely in accordance with the equities of the specific cases that
arise; and neither courts nor law journal articles should take too
rigid a view of the abstract question. This view is supported by
the extraordinary quarterhorse stallion case of Gary v. Peckham,
18
where the right to possession of a co-owned stallion 19 was said to
depend on whether the animal was acquired for speculation pur-
poses or breeding purposes. 20 So, too, is such an analysis deter-
minative in Keyes v. Scharer,21 a mare lease case, where the Michigan
court wanders back and forth between contract law and property
law.Y
B. Contract Formation and Terms
Opinions in horse cases2 as well as the U.C.C. 24 establish that
the formation of a contract depends principally on the expressed
intention of the contract's parties. In the context of an auction, a
contract is said to be formed when the hammer falls, "the same
as the acceptance of any other offer."' ' U.C.C. section 2-206
creates presumptions based on various expressions of the parties,
the general inclination of which (along with U.C.C. section 2-204)
is to encourage contract formation. It should be noted that the
formation of the contract may or may not give rise to a right to
require performance or obtain damages, depending on such matters
as the statute of frauds. 26 The existence of a potentially unenforce-
able "contract" is an analysis that stands on its own.27
" 468 F.2d 1241 (loth Cir. 1972).
19 The value of the possession derives from the fact that a substantial amount
of income flows from housing and caring for the mares which are serviced by
GO MAN GO. In addition, the horse enjoys a unique and famous standing
in horse breeding circles so as to give the owners and their premises a degree
of distinction, whereby the profits of their remaining horse breeding operation
become more valuable and the general public is drawn to the premises for the
purpose of viewing this famous animal.
Id. at 1242.
20 Id. at 1244.
21 165 N.W.2d 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
22 As to the U.C.C. and leases in general, see I R. ANDERsoN, supra note 15, at § 1-
101:19 and 2-102:11. A few states have adopted a new § 2A of the U.C.C. which applies
to the lease of goods.
2 See Courtin v. Sharp, 280 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1960) (where a verbal agreement of
sale of a colt takes immediate effect as a complete contract is a matter of intention).
2 U.C.C. § 2-206.
Richardson v. Landreth, 260 S.W. 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924). See infra notes 120-
40 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 141-67 and accompanying text.
- See, e.g., Bennett v. Horton, 592 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1979).
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Along with contracts created by expressions of the parties,
rights based upon performance'5 and trade usage29 continue to be
enforceable under the U.C.C. as in any common law implied
contract. In addition, the U.C.C. dramatically departs from tra-
ditional contract law by establishing contracts in circumstances
where there is not a traditional meeting of the minds. U.C.C.
section 2-207 was designed to give effect to business transactions
in industries that engage in "the battle of the forms"-where
buyers and sellers exchange orders and confirmations covered with
conflicting provisions in small print, and where offer never meets
acceptance in traditional terms. The U.C.C.'s provisions equally
cover an exchange of drafts by facsimile that include the appro-
priate expressions of conditional offers and acceptance. The
U.C.C.'s provisions allow an acceptance that purports to change
the terms of the deal to create a contract in a variety of circum-
stances. 0
Once a contract is formed, the U.C.C. also supplies terms for
it, every bit as much as the common law did. Discretions of parties
are limited and controlled31; implied warranties of matters other
than quality are continued 32; and absent terms (gap fillers) are
supplied, as for delivery33 and time of performance.3 4 The Code
outlines general obligations with respect to mutuality, conditions
precedent, and the like.35
In addition, non-U.C.C. contract law remains in effect, pre-
serving analogs of traditional contract doctrines not covered by the
Code. Common law doctrines such as waiver and estoppel,36 and
ratification 37 apply in horse cases, as they do elsewhere in the
- U.C.C. § 2-208.
U.C.C. § 2-202(a).
30 See Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Krieger, 710 S.W.2d 869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986);
see also 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 2-207:1-51. Although the author usually relies
on Anderson for general matters, White & Summers give the most thoughtful treatment of
the "battle of the forms." I J. W=rr & R. StmMERs, UIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-3
(3d ed. 1988).
3 U.C.C. § 2-311 (1988).
32 See, for example, the warranty of title provisions under U.C.C. § 2-312 (1988).
31 U.C.C. § 2-208. Terms regarding price are also supplied under U.C.C. § 2-305.
3, U.C.C. § 2-309.
35 U.C.C. § 2-301.
36 Sagner v. Glenangus Farms, Inc., 198 A.2d 277 (Md. 1964) (court considered
whether defendant waived his right to cancel horse syndication or was estopped from doing
so).
31 O'Shea v. Hatch, 640 P.2d 515 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (surgical repair of a horse
by buyers at suggestion of the sellers did not amount to a ratification of the original
acceptance).
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Code.38 Impossibility of performance is continued under U.C.C.
section 2-615. The first to breach a contract cannot insist on its
strict performance, 9 and a fixed contract can be abandoned and a
new one put in its place by parol evidence and by performance.
4
0
The U.C.C. also carries forward by its terms41 the rule that
parties to an agreement impliedly agree to act in good faith with
each other. 42 And contracts violating public policy are still unen-
forceable. 43 Some of these points recur in later sections of this
Article, though a complete analysis of contract formation and
terms is beyond its scope. For now, the point is simply that a horse
contract is a contract like any other, until the circumstances un-
derlying it require special treatment.
C. Title
Title is not all that it used to be. Under the U.C.C., 44 title is
a residual concept, applicable only to matters not otherwise ad-
dressed by the U.C.C. Most notably, the retention of title does
not affect the passing of risk of loss.45 Title is also a rigid concept.
For example, title as lawyers ordinarily think of it cannot be
retained by the seller in a horse he or she has delivered. 46 Irrespec-
tive of the agreement, the seller retains only a security interest
governed by U.C.C. article nine.
The U.C.C. does provide that subject to certain limitations,
"title to goods passes . .. in any manner ... explicitly agreed on
by the parties." 47 As much freedom as that sentence seems to
31 See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 1-103: 32 - 69; § 2-721:20, 37
(delay may affect the remedy of rescission); and §§ 2-711:7, 45, 2-715:12.
39 Scarborough v. Richter, 274 So. 2d 399 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
40 See Arine v. McAmis, 603 P.2d 1130 (Okl. 1979). But see U.C.C. §§ 2-209, 2-720.
41 U.C.C. § 1-203.
42 Such a doctrine will undoubtedly be applied someday to the standard rights of first
refusal that are traditionally granted in stallion syndications in several breeds. Those simply
drafted clauses are easily avoidable (if narrowly read), but the "defeat of the right of
refusal should not be allowed by use of special, peculiar terms or conditions not made in
good faith." Brownies Creek Collieries, Inc. v. Asher Coal Mn. Co., 417 S.W.2d 249 (Ky.
1967). 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 1-103: 24, lists general principals of contract,
conversion, and equity that continue in effect.
41 Occhuizzo v. Perlmutter, 426 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (contract
based in part on consideration of buyer's agreement to not report seller's illegal racing
activities held to violate public policy rendering it unenforceable).
" See U.C.C. § 2-401; R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 4-401:12 (a contract must
exist before title passes).
45 See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
- U.C.C. § 2-401(1).
" Id.
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allow, however, one should focus on the word "explicit," which
is repeated in the converse statement of the rule in the next sen-
tence."s Any control by the parties over the passing of title must
be explicit, that is, not by implication through trade usage or past
performance. Years of interesting discussion about the use of reg-
istration papers in strictly title matters49 may be beside the point.
A horse's papers may be narrowly a "certificate of interest in
property ' 50 and can certainly control the ability of a horse to
compete in many situations 51-but unless the parties explicitly refer
to them, they do not pass title.
Indeed, the U.C.C. makes the practice of some breeding as-
sociations irrelevant to title, mandating that title passes "even
though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or
place. ' 52 The rigid rule of the U.C.C. passes title "at the time and
place at which the seller completes his performance with reference
to physical delivery." 53 In the situation where a horse remains in
the possession of a bailee (including a fractional interest or share
of a stallion), the U.C.C.'s title section refers to the final act of
the seller-whereas the U.C.C.'s provision on risk of loss5 4 post-
pones the operative moment until the bailee's acknowledgment.
55
Because of the horse industry's reputation for sharp practices,
it is not unheard of that individuals sell horses when they do not
own them, or sell them more than once. Various common law
principles continue to control the title of purchasers in such events.
It is well settled that:
An owner is never divested of his property by theft, and therefore
a sale by a thief, or by any person claiming under a thief, does
not vest title in the purchaser as against the owner though the
sale was made in good faith and in the ordinary course of trade.5 6
41 U.C.C. § 2-401(2); R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-401:12 ("explicit" and
"express" are the same).
41 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 17, at 820-25.
10 United States v. Bowers, 739 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 861
(1984).
51 See Morgan v. New York Racing Ass'n, 421 N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
(improperly registered horse not allowed to race); see also Jockey Club v. United States,
137 F. Supp. 419 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (registration important for breeding purposes).
52 U.C.C. § 2-401(2).
53 Id.
' See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
, See R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-401:58.
Bozeman Mortuary Ass'n v. Fairchild, 68 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Ky. 1934); see also
Hentz v. The Idaho, 93 U.S. 575 (1876) (bailee not liable when he delivered goods to the
true owner rather than the bailor).
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If an owner's conscious conduct, however, gives the thief the
power to cause a loss, the owner may be equitably estopped from
asserting his or her title;57 this is the same rule as agency by
estoppel.55 In either case there must be a purposeful and voluntary
action on the part of the original owner, even if it was done under
some mistaken belief or deception. 59 Also, reliance is a separate
element that must be shown in estoppel. 60
A crook who fraudulently obtains title by inducing a convey-
ance from someone else is said to have a "voidable" title, as
opposed to a crook who helps himself without inducing a convey-
ance at all. This equitable distinction is relevant under U.C.C.
section 2-403(1): "A person with voidable title has power to trans-
fer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value." Whether a
person has voidable title depends upon whether the original owner
assented to a transfer.
6 1
An owner entrusts possession to the crook by delivery of the
horse. Likewise, if a crooked seller sells the horse twice, and the
first buyer leaves the horse in the possession of the crook or his
or her agent, then the first buyer has entrusted possession to the
wrongdoer. In either case, the test is only slightly different than
that applicable to voidable title: title can be transferred to a buyer
in ordinary course of business. A "buyer in ordinary course of
business" under U.C.C. section 1-201(9) must also act "in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of
the ownership rights" of another.
Most horse buyers are likely to be merchants as defined in
U.C.C. section 2-104(1); and so they will have under U.C.C.
section 2-103(l)(b) somewhat extended obligations of good faith.
In exercising their duty to be honest, they are "chargeable with
S7 E.g., Kimberly & European Diamonds, Inc. v. Burbank, 684 F.2d 363 (6th Cir.
1982).
, See infra notes 349-69 and accompanying text.
59 Cf. Anderson Contracting Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 448 So. 2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (no estoppel where owner does not voluntarily part with property).
6 J.C. Acree v. E.I.F.C., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 43, 48 (Ky. 1973); Kentucky Home Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Leitner, 196 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Ky. 1946).
61 See U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(a)-(d); see also American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National
Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248, 268 (5th Cir. 1981); Schrier v. Home Indemnity Co., 273 A.2d
248, 250 (D.C. 1971) ("A possessor of stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired,
can never convey a good title."); Olin Corp. v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 211, 216
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (status as bona fide purchaser immaterial in determining original
owner's right to recover value of its stolen goods); J. T. Marvin v. Connelly, 252 S.E.2d
562, 563 (S.C. 1979). See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-403:19; J. W=Tr
& R. SummRs, supra note 30, at § 3.11.
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the knowledge or skill of merchants." 62 When these obligations are
combined, 63 a horse merchant is precluded from buying a horse
when the seller is known to have only a voidable title.64
D. Risk of Loss
The U.C.C. clearly places the risk of loss with respect to goods
not sent by carrier or held by a bailee on the buyer at the time of
"receipt" (in the case of a merchant seller) or "tender of delivery"
(in the case of a non-merchant seller)-all subject to a "contrary
agreement. ' 65 As previously noted, the transfer of possession of
an animal with a delicate, risky physique is ordinarily the appro-
priate time to place the burden of ownership on the person who
now controls the animal's destiny. 66 The term "contrary agree-
ment" appears often in the statute. Unlike the parallel provisions
with respect to title under the Code, this agreement need not be
express. 67 Risk of loss may pass well after title has passed,68 and
surely will often pass after the buyer has obtained an insurable
interest in the horse. 69 Risk of loss is flexible, allowing for the
possibility of shifting back the risk of loss in the event that there
has been a failure to conform to the contract in a context giving
rise to a right of rejection. 70 A well-reasoned Arkansas horse case7'
gives some insight into the permutations available under those
provisions.
An interesting variation on the passage of risk with possession
involves the sale of a fractional interest in a stallion. The typical
case is where there is never a change of possession-rather, the
62 U.C.C. § 2-104(3) (1972).
0 See Kimberly v. European Diamonds, 684 F.2d at 366; Sherrock v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708 (Del. 1971); Porter v. Wertz, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105 (N.Y. 1981);
Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 317 N.Y.S.2d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); Mattek v.
Malofsky, 1165 N.W.2d 406 (Wis. 1969).
6, See, e.g., Dempsey v. D.B.& M. Oil & Gas Co., 112 F. Supp. 408, 411 (E.D. Ky.
1953).
6 U.C.C. § 2-509. R. ANDERsoN, supra note 15, at § 2-401:12 states that there must
be a contract before risk of loss passes.
61 Madaus v. November Hill Farm, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Va. 1986).
67 See U.C.C. § 1-201(3), which makes clear that various agreements may be implied.
Acts which may not be sufficient to establish a contract for statute of frauds purposes (see,
e.g., infra note 145) may imply this term of an established contract.
61 See supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text.
9 U.C.C. § 2-501.
70 U.C.C. § 2-510.
71 McKnight v. Bellamy, 449 S.W.2d 706 (Ark. 1970).
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horse is kept perpetually in the hands of a syndicate manager (the
bailee). In this situation, absent a cofitrary agreement, risk of loss
depends on the transfer of papers, or (as is usually the case)
recognition by the syndicate manager that "right to possession of
the goods" has been transferred. 72 Extraordinary emphasis must
therefore be placed on the syndicate agreement and the practices
of the syndicate manager.
Even in the case of the sale of a whole animal, it may not be
contemplated that the last act in the sale is the transfer of posses-
sion of the horse. Risk of loss may well pass where the appropriate
intention is express or implied, even if the seller retains possession.
73
A further variation on the risk of loss involves situations where
there is to be a continuing relationship between the parties to the
transaction. In the case of newly syndicated stallions, the seller to
the syndicate will ordinarily retain an interest in the horse and
involve himself or herself in its promotion.
The Eighth Circuit in a recent case involving an Arabian
stallion74 focused on the risk of loss issue (under the rubric of
impossibility of performance) in the context of a continuing rela-
tionship between the parties. It held, as would seem appropriate,
that when the buyer "assumes the risk" of the stallion's death, the
impossibility of continuing performance is irrelevant. 75 The court
also wisely explained why the parties might enter into a contract
"to promote a dead horse.' '76 At least one court has explained the
- U.C.C. § 2-509(2). There usually are no "negotiable" title papers under subsection
(a), and store owners probably are never entitled to "possession" in any meaningful sense,
unless use of a nomination in possession of "the goods." See supra notes 3-22 and
accompanying text. For subsection (3), dealing with "non-negotiable" title papers, see
U.C.C. §§ 2-503(4)0b) and 2-509(4).
- Courtin, 280 F.2d 345.
14 Arabian Score v. Lasma Arabian Ltd., 814 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1987).
11 Id. at 531.
76 Arabian argues that the decision to promote a dead horse is per se arbitrary.
As indicated above, however, Lasma's unrebutted evidence shows that Lasma
Star Stallion, Inc. and Lasma regularly promote deceased horses. This is done
to enhance the owning entity's reputation and to increase the value of the
stallion's progeny. Further, the language of paragraph 4 was not intended to
cover the risk of death but of ineligibility for other reasons, such as infertility
or substandard offspring ....
The parties to this agreement were sophisticated and, we assume, well-
heeled business persons, however, and that which we find to be somewhat
unusual may be commonplace to those who inhabit the wealthy world of the
horsey set.
Id. at 532.
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relationship between frustration of purpose, impossibility of per-
formance, and warranty.
77
E. Unconscionability
Definitions of unconscionability vary depending upon the par-
ticular facts of each case. Because this topic has been broadly and
intelligently discussed elsewhere, 78 the following analysis concen-
trates solely on the troubling nature of the unconscionability cases
as applied to the horse business.
That task begins by suggesting that unconscionability is to be
discussed across the boundaries of a particular cause of action or
defense. U.C.C. section 2-302, after all, provides broadly that "[i]f
the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable," appropriate relief is
always available, adopting close to the same terms as the U.C.C.'s
specific relief from implied warranty disclaimers.7 9 This reflects the
general rule of the Restatement of Contracts as well. 0
The U.C.C. treats disclaimers of ordinary Code remedies under
a separate paragraph.81 Insofar as unconscionability relates to lim-
itation of damages, its relationship to the issue of liquidated dam-
age provisions should be noted.82 The Fifth Circuit in a non-horse
case83 wisely made many of the following points, but the court also
accused other courts of "a misunderstanding of the difference
between a warranty disclaimer and a limitation on consequential
damage remedies."81 4 While the U.C.C.'s treatment of remedy lim-
itations establishes a different verbal standard-whether they pre-
serve their "essential purpose" 8 -this Article contends that it is
" United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 508 F.2d 377
(2nd Cir. 1974).
78 Cohan, supra note 3, at 683-86; Kropp & Landen, supra note 3; Scott, Exculpatory
Language in Horse Contracts: Ability to Control the Risk, ANNuAL EQUINE LAW SEmINAR,
Univ. of Ky. (1987); see also 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-313:113-19; Miller,
Auction, Exchange and Non-Private Sale of Horses and Interests in Horses, SEMIAR ON
EQUINE LAW, Univ. of Ky. (1986); Annotation, Construction and Effect of Affirmative
Provisions in Contract of Sale by Which Purchaser Agrees to Take Article "As Is, " in the
Condition in Which It Is, or Equivalent Term, 24 A.L.R.3d 465 (1969).
79 U.C.C. § 2-316.
10 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
82 See U.C.C. § 2-718; see also Mattingly Bridge Co. v. Holloway & Son Const. Co.,
694 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1985).
, FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 420.
U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1972).
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appropriate to consider both issues as part of the same analysis.
Preventing unfairness and preserving the essential transaction are
the same goals, and they are analyzed by considering the same
facts. There is no misunderstanding at all. Typical non-horse cases
refer to the analysis as being "substantially identical"-and a part
of the same body of law as disclaimers of tort liability.8 6 This
approach is amply supported.
87
One separate provision, however, does set the U.C.C. apart
from the common law. The U.C.C. mandates that express warran-
ties and their disclaimers be construed as consistent when possible,
but that limitations on such warranties shall not be effective when
inconsistent with the express warranties themselves.8 8 This pre-
sumption in favor of express warranties applies only to the express
warranty cause of action. There is, nevertheless, a tendency by
some courts to lean on such a presumption more generally, even
in horse cases.
89
1. Traditional Factors. Willfulness, Total Failure, and Public
Policies
One quite different approach to unconscionability issues has
traditionally been to suggest that certain clauses, or clauses with
certain effects, are unconscionable on their face. It has been held
that when an "extraneous representation amounting to fraud" has
been made, but the written contract clearly requires the buyer to
assume the risk of the very problem about which the representation
was made, the provision for exculpation will not be enforced.9°
Certain non-warranty categories of warranty-type claims are some-
times held to be facially unreasonable. Thus, some courts treat a
total failure of consideration9' and fraud generally. 92 "Total failure
"E.g., K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 541 P.2d 1378 (Or. 1975).
" R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-302:32, 2-316:25; Roberts, "Unconscionability,
Under U.C.C. § 2-302 or § 2-719(3), of Disclaimer of Warranties or Limitation or Exclusion
of Damages in Contract Subject to U.C.C. Article 2 (Sales)", 38 A.L.R. 4th 25 (1983).
Many of the common factors are set out in comment d to § 208 of R.STATEIMNT (SEcoND)
OF CONTRACTS.
U.C.C. § 2-316.
" Caravello v. Pine Hollow Stud Farm, Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978).
Ferguson v. Cussins, 713 S.W.2d 5, 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846, 850 (3rd Cir. 1967).
92 Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981) (seller failed
to deliver breeds of pigs described in agreement so the limitation-of-remedies clause failed
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of consideration" is close, even verbally, to "failure of essential
purpose" in the remedy limitation statute, which suggests that this
Article's right of rescission analysis93 is also applicable. 94 The per
se unconscionable cases reflect the common doctrine in tort law
that one cannot by a contract disclaim one's liability for gross
negligence or willful or wanton conduct.
95
It is not generally the modern rule, however, to take so rigid
a view in striking contractual provisions to which parties have
purposely agreed. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
96
sets out a modern rule that is much more vague. Express assump-
tions of risks are stricken only when "contrary to public policy,"
such as in the case of public duties and disparities of bargaining
power, 97 matters not so different from the horse contract consid-
erations discussed in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts9 and
in the cause of action sections of this Article. 99 The rigid cases are
sometimes distinguished by courts as evidencing situations "preg-
nant with evil," as in the horse case of Rutter v. Arlington Park
Jockey Club,100 or as reflecting some "element of a willful intent"
to defraud. 10 1
of its essential purpose and was unenforceable); Sanfillipo v. Rarden, 493 N.E.2d 991 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1985) (clause limiting liability of real estate agent unenforceable when agent
misrepresented the availability of utility services); George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v.
Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 1979) (covenants waiving warranties on disclaiming
or limiting liabilities ineffective when contract was fraudulently induced); Butcher v. Garrett-
Enumclaw Co., 581 P.2d 1352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (where misrepresentations were made
as to sawmill's capabilities, contract clause disclaiming all warranties was unreasonable and
unconscionable).
91 See infra notes 434-78 and accompanying text.
94 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-719:81, suggests it is closer to "substantial"
on the spectrum than any other term.
11 Shelby Mut. Ins. v. Grand Rapids, 148 N.W.2d 260 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (fire
protection contract limiting liability for failure to provide adequate protection did not
include failure to provide any protection); Tessler & Son, Inc. v. Sonitrol Sec. Sys. Inc.,
497 A.2d 530 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (court would enforce contract clause limiting
liability for negligent conduct even in case of gross negligence, but not in case of willful
and wanton misconduct); Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749
(N.Y. 1983) ("[A]n exculpatory agreement ... will not apply to exemption of willful or
grossly negligent acts.").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1964).
91 Id. at comments g, j.
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comments c, d.
" See infra notes 392-98, 408-09, 421, 444, 501, 504, 524, 531, 549-50, 564-68, 567,
587 and accompanying text. See especially infra note 596 and accompanying text.
1- 510 F.2d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting Schnackenberg v. Towle, 123 N.E.2d
817, 819 (Ill. 1954)).
0t Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 351 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. App. Div.
1974).
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This Article cites dozens of cases below that recall the "ban-
ditry" history of the horse business, 0 2 and so we would expect a
somewhat higher tolerance here for the threshold of conscionabil-
ity. Even in the case of what would otherwise seem the most basic
fraud, in a horse case it can be held that "a merger clause con-
taining a specific disclaimer of the very representations upon which
a cause of action in fraud is predicated will preclude inquiry into
the alleged representations." 103 As a fraud case, Fasig-Tipton Co.
v. Jaffe does not come within the U.C.C.'s express warranty
presumption against remedy limitations-but, as a general notion,
should not the burden be higher in a fraud case than in a mere
warranty case? This theoretical conflict-the freedom to contract
versus the urge to protect consumers-is a very deep one. It is one
this Article will often pose, and not comfortably resolve.
No matter where along a spectrum a case falls, no rigid,
unanalyzed cases can be ignored. In advising a client entering into
a transaction, or when a transaction has come apart, one must
keep in mind that there are certain situations that will strike a
court as being unconscionable without engaging in lengthy analysis;
Alpert v. Thomas is such a case. ° The court implicitly held that
where an express warranty has been made, an implied warranty
cannot be disclaimed. The true teaching of the case is that the
court was so shocked by the result of the transaction that it was
set aside.
While most courts, even in horse cases, would not condone an
actual, conscious fraud, it would be common to recognize that
caveat emptor "is a commercial reality in respect of the transfer
of used cars" 105 and horses. The relationship between a new and a
used car is apt. 10 In each, the lemon feature may not be the seller's
fault. With a new car, it is at least the manufacturer's fault,
regardless of whether anyone else in the short chain of title knew
anything about the defect. Cases about manufactured products are
always distinguishable.
2. Procedural Factors: Trade Usage, Power, and Form
Another approach to conscionability with an equally distinct
application to horses is procedural unconscionability-referring to
"0 See infra notes 417-22 and accompanying text; see also, Miller, supra note 17, at
789.
" Fasig-Tipton Co. v. Jaffe, 449 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
104 643 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Vt. 1986).
1oS Greg Coats Cars, Inc. v. Kasey, 576 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
101 See infra note 412 and accompanying text.
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the general characteristics of the business, and the relations between
the parties.107 Some cases hold that the fact that all similar sellers
disclaim warranties tends to make them seem, "reasonable". 10 That
is the usual reason to prove a custom. 0 9 Some cases make the
more reasonable assumption that such generality (especially in an
oligopolistic industry) is evidence that the purchasers are not in a
position to bargain freely."10 The former principle is usually applied
in animal cases."1
The opposite should be the result if there in fact is "an absence
of meaningful choice" and no "availability of alternative forms"
of doing the business. 1 2 Thus, if farmers cannot remain in business
without buying certain pesticides, and if all pesticide companies
disclaim meaningful responsibility, unconscionability may be
found.13 Otherwise, the growing of corn may end to the detriment
of the public. Absence of meaningful choice is one procedural
example of unequal bargaining power, which requires an individ-
ualized analysis, and is the usual formulation in conscionability
matters in both tort and contract. 1 4
Does either sort of procedural context exist in any transaction
involving horses? Does either (a) familiarity with common practices
suggest reasonability or (b) does uniformity of practices exclude
real choices? These are the tantalizing questions raised by Travis
,07 See J. WrEm & R. SummmRs, supra note' 30, at 204.
oI See Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(limitation of remedies common in sale of motion picture film).
09 Miller, supra note 17, at 800-01.
10 Durham v. CIBA-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696, 700 (S.D. 1982) ("[P]urchasers of
pesticides are not in position to bargain with chemical manufacturers for contract terms.").
"I Sessa, 427 F. Supp. at 766 (Guarantee of horses "not a common thing."), aff'd,
568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978); Torstenson v. Melcher, 241 N.W.2d 103 (Neb. 1976) (catalog
guarantee is only expected warranty in cattle business); Kincheloe v. Gledmeier, 619 S.W.2d
272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (local custom of as is sales at cattle auctions sufficient to exclude
or modify warranty of merchantibility).
112 Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228, 233 (D.C. 1971) (lack of alternatives
in consumer credit).
3 CIBA-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d at 700. But see Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (New York law will find unconscion-
ability only where lack of meaningful choice is combined with contract terms favorable to
one party); Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 333 N.Y.S.2d 818, 823 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1972) (common industry practice of limiting remedy not unconscionable). As to
the "business-practices-of-the-community" test, see Tulowitzki v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
396 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1978) (inquiring is comparison with contemporary local business
practice).
114 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, supra note 96; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, supra note 98.
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v. Washington Horse Breeders Association, Inc.115 Is there really
an innocent, oppressed "new buyer," 116 as the Washington Court
of Appeals thought? The author suspects that there are very few
inexperienced consumers in the horse business. 17 Buyers of race-
horses, serious show horses and breeding animals ordinarily are
not neophytes-or if they are neophytes they are ordinarily repre-
sented by experienced bloodstock agents and/or veterinarians.
Procedural unconscionability can focus as well on the form in
which the potentially offending paragraph appears in the contract.
With respect to disclaimers of implied warranties, conspicuous
display of the disclaimer is specifically required by U.C.C.118 The
clarity with which the purchaser (presumably especially the new
buyer) actually understands what he or she is facing will alter the
likelihood that the clause will be upheld under the general notion
of "absence (or presence) of meaningful choice."
1 1 9
F. Auctions
One of the recurring themes in this Article is that the venue of
the horse sale will influence the results of many controversies.
Horses are often sold at auctions, and those auctions carry with
them unique practices that vary widely among the breeds.
1. Common Characteristics: Public Functions
All auctions have distinct characteristics. One characteristic in
the horse business is that all auctions are for the most part governed
by similar legislation-generally embodied in the venue's Uniform
"1 759 P.2d 418 (Wash. 1988). For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes
214-18 and accompanying text.
116 Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Association, Inc., 734 P.2d 956 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987).
M In another context Forbis v. Reilly, 684 F. Supp. 1317 (W.D. Pa. 1988) analyzes
such a claim. Id. at 1323. It is clear that where deals are between business persons, involving
purely a commercial transaction, there will be a greater likelihood to approve the terms of
an agreement. See, e.g., FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980).
The opposite rule applies "to contracts between consumers and skilled corporate sellers."
Id. at 420. As the law develops, cases are sometimes decided that involve such disparities
of position, and general rules are stated-without suggesting that they may not apply
between business people. Such a case is Ford Motor Company v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979), which has excessively influenced the development of equine law
(because the opinion was written by a respected judge in Kentucky where so many equine
cases are decided).
"t U.C.C. § 2-316.
,,9 Block, 286 A.2d at 233.
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Commercial Code. The Code provisions are more or less clear, and
have recently been annotated.1 20
On a deeper level, all auctions bear the common characteristic
that they involve sales "in which the price is determined by the
competition of bidders."' 2 ' That is, a market-driven price is assured
by the simultaneous presence of many sellers and many buyers-
including non-breeders and non-racers. They share this character-
istic with securities trading markets 2 2 and commodity futures trad-
ing markets.
2
1
Auctions create liquidity for sellers and an open price-setting
mechanism, which in turn helps set the price of horses sold off the
markets, and collateral appraisals for loans made from day to day.
Horse auctions differ from the organized markets for the sale of
securities and commodities futures in that sales of horses occur
privately to a far larger degree; private trades in these other two
industries are relatively rare. Nonetheless, auctions provide a focus
for participants in each horse industry (and prospective partici-
1'0 Annotation, Auction Sales Under U.C.C. Section 2-328, 44 A.L.R. 4th 110 (1986);
see also R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-328:5.
M2, A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 108 (1963); see also Backus v. MacLaury, 106
N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951) ("The purchase was made at an auction sale and
not by negotiation between the parties. At such sale the price is determined by competitive
bidding."), appeal denied, 107 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951).
'" The economic function of the trading markets is to create liquidity-a market
characteristic that enables investors to dispose of or purchase securities at a
price reasonably related to the preceding price. For the sale of a new issue of
securities to succeed, prospective purchasers must have a reasonable assurance
of liquidity in the market for-the security. Thus, the success of new-issue
markets is dependent on the effectiveness of trading markets. In addition,
since trading markets are a price setting mechanism, they facilitate the use of
securities as collateral for loans, determine the price at which a company is
able to issue additional securities, and establish a basis for the valuation of
securities for taxation and other purposes.
T. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 667-68 (1983).
'2 A central purpose of futures markets, based upon Congressional and regu-
latory policy, is to provide a means for commercial enterprises to hedge or
price their business transactions. And yet, it is highly unlikely that the com-
mercial world's need for futures contracts at any given time will be exactly
balanced ... Commodity investors are admitted access to these markets in
order to fill the demand for futures contracts even when no commercial firm
has an interest in doing so, and to "make a market" when the commercial
users are, for one reason or another, on the sidelines. [A user or seller of a
product] cannot realistically expect that another commercial firm will always
be ready, willing, and able to assume the other side [of a sale, and so a seller]
welcomes the constant presence in the market of commodity investors who
can fulfill its needs quickly and efficiently.
P. JOHNSON, CoMMoDIms REGULATION § 1.116 (1982).
[VOL. 78
SALE OF HORSES
pants) even if they are not personally present at the auction. In
short, the auctions have a public function that deeply affects
broader segments of the economy.
Such considerations were recognized early. 24 Because of an
auction's public function, "sharp practice" is not permitted at the
public auction-that is, any practice that "could not have been
done except to deceive somebody-if nobody else, the other bidders
at the sale."' 2  Similarly, the creation of an atmosphere not favor-
able to spirited bidding can cause a sale to be set aside. 126 Only
because of the standard U.C.C. provision permitting it is the owner
of the horse entitled to bid on the horse. 27 The common law rule
was that "the purchaser has the right to repudiate" his or her bid
at auction where the owners of property had "buy-bid" at the
auction. 12 Thus, auction sales are often held to a higher standard
than face-to-face transactions. The fall of the hammer does not
create a contract precisely "the same as the acceptance of any
other offer."' 29
2. The Auctioneer: Public Duties
Another undeniable fact is that every auction introduces a new
actor into the transaction, viz., the auctioneer. This has two effects.
First, the auctioneer can create implied liabilities for the seller. 30
And second, there is the possibility of a second defendant. '3'
"I As in Robenson v. Yann, 5 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Ky. 1928) ("Auction sales are of
public concern, and the law will not tolerate any ... unfair ... conduct in such sales.").
11 Id. at 273.
"' Kellerman v. Dedman, 411 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1967) (assault and battery committed
upon auctioneer).
" U.C.C. § 2-328(4).
Burdon v. Seitz, 267 S.W. 219, 220 (Ky. 1924).
2 Richardson, 260 S.W. at 129.
I" Annotation, Implied or Apparent Authority of Agent Selling Personal Property to
Make Warranties, 40 A.L.R. 2d 285 (1955) (particularly at § 10); see also infra notes 347-
69 and accompanying text; cf. Belmont's Ex'r v. Talbot, 51 S.W. 588, 588 (Ky. 1899)
("There being no custom to warrant at this public sale, it may be that a warranty by the
auctioneer would not bind Mr. Belmont.").
M The auctioneer may incur personal liability. See infra notes 287-346 and 417-22 and
accompanying text; Annotation, Liability of Auctioneer or Clerk to Buyer as to Title,
Condition, or Quality of Property Sold, 80 A.L.R. 2d 1239 (1961); Annotation, Personal
Liability of Auctioneer to Owner or Mortgagee for Conversion, 96 A.L.R. 2d 208 (1964);
McElroy v. Long, 170 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir. 1948) ("The fact that he is known to a
bidder to be an auctioneer, by profession selling as an agent for others, is of no import
and is no notice that he may not be selling his own property."); Barrett v. Rumeliote, 126
N.W.2d 322 (Iowa 1964) (factor held liable is sale of pigs); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.
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It is perhaps due to a convergence of the public function of an
auction and the introduction of a third party in the form of the
auctioneer that auctioneers are an exception to the general rule
that one person cannot serve as the agent of competing parties.'
32
While the acceptance of dual agency can be attributed to the
imputed consent of the parties, it can also be seen as the auc-
tioneer's performance of a public function. 133 Justice Cardozo said
that partners have the highest fiduciary duties known to the law.
134
He did not consider auctioneers.
3. Variations: Usages of Trade
The common public characteristic of all auctions must be con-
trasted with the equally important fact that auctions vary, both as
to the published conditions of the sale and as to the unwritten
practices that occur. Both types of variations fit into the language
of the U.C.C., which provides for passage of title to occur at the
fall of the hammer "or in [any] other customary manner."'' 35 A
written custom in one Tennessee horse auction was to allow all
sellers to refuse the highest bid if that option was exercised before
the horse was led out of the ring. 36 In that case, even the improper
depression of the purchase price by the auctioneer was waived
when the seller did not object promptly, but let the horse walk out
of the ring. In an older Iowa case, the bidders (rather than the
seller) were given the option to purchase either the horse they bid
on, or two horses of a team at twice the "knock down" price.'
37
According to custom, only after the hammer had fallen, and after
the option was exercised, was there a binding deal. In that case,
after the two-horse option was elected, a breach of warranty as to
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1973) (auctioneer liable for
breach of warranty of title in automobile sale); Itoh v. Kimi Sales, Ltd., 345 N.Y.Supp.2d
416, 420 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) ("There may be circumstances ... where the auctioneer may
be liable for a breach of warranty."), overruled on other grounds, 494 N.Y.S.2d 598, 600
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Gessler v. Winton, 145 S.W.2d 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1940) (auc-
tioneer liable for breach of warranty of title in sale of mules). See sections II(A) and III(C)
of this Article.
M3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-201:88.
"- For a discussion of the unique treatment given to auctioneers as a result, see infra
notes 221-49 and 296-316 and accompanying text.
- Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
135 U.C.C. § 2-328(2) (1972).
11 Bradshaw v. Thompson, 454 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878
(1972).
"I Lahiff v. Keville, 169 N.W. 751, 752 (Iowa 1918).
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one of the horses was discovered. Rescission of the entire trans-
action was allowed, because the custom adopted by that auction
allowed the purchaser's "intention" to be a fact that "dominated
the question of severability."' 3 8
More important customs at particular auctions vary as to the
question of warranties. It is apparently the custom in Ontario that
purchasers have the absolute right to reject horses purchased at
auction based on warranty-type defects, irrespective of the warran-
ties given.' 39 This rule can be contrasted with the old-time Kentucky
custom-based rule that, even if an auctioneer tried to make a
warranty, it was ineffective. 14°
G. Statute of Frauds
The typical horse sale transaction raises statute of frauds ques-
tions. Horses are often sold (in a face-to-face transaction) with a
shake of hands, and (at auction) with a nod of the head and a fall
of the hammer. U.C.C. section 2-201 provides that contracts for
the sale of goods for a price of five hundred dollars or more are
not enforceable, but for listed exceptions, "unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.'
' 4'
Much case law has developed with respect to the adequacy of
the writing. Standard concepts suggest that almost any memoran-
dum that acknowledges the existence of a contract will suffice,
including one that intends to terminate contractual relations. 4 2 An
interesting question arises as to whether the execution of horse
registration papers satisfies the statute of frauds. It has been sug-
gested elsewhere that the "acid test" of the efficacy of registration
papers, apart from their use in breeding and racing, is their use-
fulness as a "memorandum" within the statute of frauds.' 43 A
recent case in the standardbred industry suggests that execution of
M' Id. at 752.
M Gallant v. Hobbs, 37 O.R.2d 1 (1982).
140 Belmont's Ex'r, 51 S.W. at 588 ("There being no custom to warrant at this public
sale, it may be that a warranty by the auctioneer would not bind Mr. Belmont.").
I0 U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
141 Angle v. Haas, 251 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Ky. 1952); see also R. ANDERSON, supra note
15, at §§ 2-201:59 - 78 and :95.
"'1 Miller, supra note 17, at 825. It is submitted that the efficacy will depend on the
custom of the particular horse business as to the meaning of registration papers.
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the registration papers is adequate under the statute.14 On the
other hand, a recent horse case has held that the execution of a
conditional application for mortality insurance does not adequately
indicate that the sale has occurred.14 5
U.C.C. section 2-201(2) allows the statute to be avoided by a
writing of the party claiming under the contract, if the other party
who is a merchant does not object. U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c)
recognizes an exception that solves most problems in the horse
business: once the horse has been paid for and accepted, or received
and accepted, the statute of frauds no longer provides a bar to
enforcement of the oral contract. This might include any "act or
conduct by the buyer manifesting his assent to becoming the owner
of specific goods."'146 Authorities vary on whether post payment
of the purchase price removes the contract from the statutey,
4 7
apparently depending on whether the judge or writer shares the
policy views underlying its adoption. One pre-U.C.C. horse case
148
holds that "a delivery of a part of the goods satisfies the statute"
of frauds. 149 A more recent horse case rejects a host of proposed
exceptions and memoranda, including holding (but not endorsing)
a check. 50
Ordinary "acceptance" under the U.C.C. requires far more
than is required to satisfy the statute of frauds.'-' For that reason,
most auction houses require that buyers sign an acknowledgment
of purchase before much time elapses. As to sellers at auction,
there are usually consignment contracts that make a sale contingent
only upon the receipt of a final bid-which the auction company
is allowed to receive as the seller's agent. In many auction sales,
-" Muslin v. Frelinghuysen Livestock Managers, 777 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th Cir. 1985).
141 McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. Supp. 211, 218 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
'4 Hanson v. Linley, 470 P.2d 78 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 477
P.2d 453 (Colo. 1970); see also Norton v. Lindsay, 350 F.2d 46 (10th Cir. 1965) (oral
contract valid in sale of horse); Greer v. Williams, 375 So. 2d 333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (damages on oral contract in horse sale); Strauss v. West, 216 A.2d 366 (R.I. 1966).
147 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-201:192; J. Wm & R. SuMRss, supra note
30, at § 2-5. See also In re Flying W Airways, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1972) and
Presti v. Wilson, 348 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) for further complication on this issue:
where performance will count?-and does the payment refer adequately to the contract
terms?
,41 Kendrick v. Hochradel, 132 N.W. 521 (Mich. 1911).
149 Id. at 522.
- Presti v. Wilson, 348 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).
M, See infra notes 433-78 and accompanying text. For a general treatment of "receipt
and acceptance" under the statute of frauds, see R. ANDERo N, supra note 15, at § 2-
201:173-:189.
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the conditions of sale provide that the auctioneer is the agent of
both parties for the execution of the memorandum of purchase.
This is recognized as an exception to the general prohibition against
agents acting for both parties.
152
In the ordinary case, the appointment of an agent is done
orally; 153 and yet the statute gives such an agent the right to sign
the confirmatory writing. 154 The role of the agent is particularly
interesting with respect to a further exception listed in the U.C.C.
allowing the enforceability of the writing where "the party against
whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or
otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made. 1' 55 It is
correctly held that the judicial admission of the agent acting in the
transaction is the equivalent of the party's admission.1 56 Persons
who seek to hide behind the statute of frauds need to beware of
honest agents. 15
7
In addition, there are many common law exceptions to the
statute of frauds. U.C.C. section 2-202 provides that the exceptions
are those "otherwise provided in this section;" but courts often go
beyond the statute. The statute of frauds has never been a barrier
to causes of action for fraud (i.e., a knowing false representation
that is relied on) or equitable estoppel (a commitment made apart
from the contract). 5
8
McClure v. Duggan,159 for example, holds that the statute of
frauds does not bar a claim sounding in fraud when the related
oral contract was unenforceable under the statute and where the
false statement was not purely promissory. In this case, a statement
12 Id. at § 2-201:88; see also supra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
M In some jurisdictions, however, the agent's authority must also be in writing. See,
e.g., Wilcher v. McGuire, 537 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (auctioneer's insertion
of seller's name on sale contract did not satisfy statute of frauds requirement that author-
ization to make contract be in writing).
1 4 See R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-201:86; see also CAL. COM. CODE § 2210(l)
(West 1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 371.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987) [hereinafter
K.R.S.]. But see Wilcher, 537 S.W.2d at 847.
U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(b).
25 Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 142 (6th Cir. 1983)
(admission in deposition by sales manager); Alter & Sons, Inc. v. United Eng's & Construc-
tors, 366 F. Supp. 959 (S.D. Ill. 1973) (admission through testimony of sales representative
and project superintendent).
7 See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-201:208-:223.
"I J. Wmnm & R. SummERs, supra note 30, at 56; R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at §
201:233; REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) TORTS § 530 comment c (1976); see also Duval v. Steele,
453 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1970).
" 674 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
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induced the purchaser to abandon the contract, which was contin-
gent on approval by the buyer's veterinarian. The contrary result,
said the court, would be reached in the event that the plaintiff
"merely alleged that the seller made an oral promise without the
intention of performing it."' 16 The defense of promissory estoppel
(an oral contract plus reliance) is more problematic.' 6
Finally, it should be noted that the U.C.C.'s statute of frauds,
like the traditional statute of frauds, provides solely a defense for
persons seeking to avoid an oral contract. The "contract" is still
in existence, but simply may or may not be enforceable. 16 2 Any
number of consequences can arise in this situation. The tort of
interference with contractual relations1 63 may be available under
proper circumstances, though "the greater definiteness of the oth-
er's expectancy" is one of the factors weighing against enforcement
of the tort. 64 In addition, where ordinary contract remedies may
not be available, appropriate circumstances may dictate the en-
forcement of a "constructive trust.' ' 65 The court in In re Perret16
must have considered equitable principles when it enforced an oral
contract for the purchase of four stallion nominations, with no
writing whatever.'
67
H. Parol Evidence Rule
In the horse business, application of the parol evidence rule is
often a serious matter. Its application is frequently related to the
16 Id. at 221. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 530; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRACTS § 166 comment c (1981). As to mistake, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONTRACTS
§ 156 (1981).
,63 Compare Finney Co. Ins. v. Monarch Const. Co., 670 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. 1984)
(acceptance of bid in construction setting did not create enforceable contractual relationship)
and C.G. Campbell & Son, Inc. v. Comdeg Corp., 586 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979)
(statute of frauds bars enforcement of oral agreement to use construction bid) with Meade
Const. Co. v. Mansfield Commercial Elec. Inc., 579 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1979) (fairness and
equity should enforce bid agreement). See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-
201:36-:37; Roeder, Commercial Law, 69 Ky. L.J. 517, 518 (1980-81) (Campbell decision
"makes no sense.").
162 Calloway v. Calloway, 707 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. 1986) (agreement regarding property
in divorce proceedings).
363 RESTATEENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 766a (1979).
"64 Id. at § 767 comment e.
161 Langford v. Sigmon, 167 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1943); see also May v. May, 223 S.W.2d
3612 (Ky. 1949) (constructive trust growing out of an oral agreement).
16 67 Bankr. 757 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986).
167 Id. at 767, 777. An alternative explanation may be that the sale of a nomination
was not a sale at all, but some other form of transaction not covered by the statute of
frauds.
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enforceability of written disclaimers of liability. 168 In a typical trans-
action, the written contract or the conditions of sale of the auction
will provide that all implied warranties (and sometimes all express
warranties outside the writing) are disclaimed. But at the time of or
before the execution of the contract, or in the stable area where
buyers and sellers meet before the auction, the seller or his or her
agent has made what might be construed to be an express warranty.
Another typical fact pattern involves the auctioneer making state-
ments during the course of the auction, either "over the loudspeaker
before the sale," 169 or during a lull in the bidding.1 70 In another
scenario, printed materials circulate to prospective bidders.1 71 In
other transactions, less typical but not unheard of, sellers of horses
will make promises as to further performance after the auction or
sale that are not reduced to writing. In each case, the writing is
either silent on the subject of the oral warranty or promise-or
explicitly disclaims or contradicts it.
In the horse business, as elsewhere, judicial opinions in this
area are not consistent. Oral statements are enforced from time to
time despite apparently complete writings reflecting the deal.172 On
the other hand, the parol evidence rule has been rigidly enforced
to prevent the enforcement of promises, even those that might be
stretched to be called fraud, where the buyer was not "misled as
to the actual words and terms of the agreement he executed, even
though he himself could not read them, or even [though the seller]
misled him as to his existing intentions."' 173 While this result may
find support in some instances, 174 usually it does not. Ordinarily,
conscious fraud is an exception to the parol evidence rule, 175 at
least where the fraud is "collateral," and not merely "promis-
sory.' ' 76 The same rule applies to "mistake."'
77
I' See supra notes 78-119 and accompanying text.
169 Slyman v. Pickwick Farms, 472 N.E. 2d 380, 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
170 Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, 400 F.2d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 1968).
M' McKnight, 449 S.W.2d 706.
,- See id. at 706-707; Slyman, 472 N.E.2d at 382; Arine v. McAmis, 603 P.2d 1130
(Okla. 1979) (oral representations of mare's fertility).
173 Feinberg v. Leach, 243 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1957).
174 See, e.g., Dreyer-Whitehead & Goedecke, Inc. v. Land, 216 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1948)
(sale of heavy equipment to knowledgeable buyer). This case also notes the fairly obvious
point that implied warranties are also excluded by an "as is" clause. Id. at 414.
M' R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-202:55; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CoNTRAcTs § 214(d) (1981).
176 Cf. McClure, 674 F. Supp. at 245.
" R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-202:59. Professor Anderson says that except
for "partial" modifications under U.C.C. § 2-202, parol evidence rules remain intact. Id.
at § 1-103:34. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(d).
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In addition, it is always the rule that if a word or expression
is indefinite or ambiguous, the surrounding circumstances (includ-
ing conversations) are admissible to construe it. 178 Parol evidence
can be used to tie a particular word to an express warranty. 179 For
example, in Lundberg v. Church Farm, Inc.,180 the statement that
a stallion "stands" at a particular farm was explained by conver-
sations among the parties to amount to a representation that there
was a binding commitment to keep the horse at the specified farm.
The opinion is probably wrong in its interpretation of the word,
but the application of the parol evidence rule is undoubtedly cor-
rect. Even the existence of an ambiguity, or the meaning of an
apparently unambiguous expression, may call for extraneous evi-
dence for interpretation.'' These rules cannot be stretched to "con-
tradict" an explicit term.8
2
The parol evidence rule is inapplicable as well where the testi-
mony is offered to show whether the parties intended to form a
contract.'83 Even more obviously, proof of custom's 4 and any other
facts that give rise to an implication of a term or contract' 85 are
outside the rule. 8 6 In the case of Sagner v. Glenangus Farms,
"I R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-202:61; see also Rudd-Melikian, Inc. v. Merritt,
282 F.2d 924, 928 (6th Cir. 1960) (contract to be considered as a whole and circumstances
of execution can be considered without violating parole evidence rule); Billips v. Hughes,
259 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Ky. 1953) (parties' intent given great weight in determining meaning of
ambiguous contract); Stubblefield v. Farmer, 165 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Ky. 1942) ("[A]mbiguities
may be explained by parol evidence."), opinion supplemented, 180 S.W.2d 405 (Ky. 1944);
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. v. Means, 95 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Ky. 1936) (consider contract language
in light of all circumstances), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 578 (1936).
"I See R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-313:27. Obviously, parol evidence is usually
necessary in showing the knowledge of the seller of a buyer's needs. Id. at § 2-315:66.
502 N.E.2d 806 (III. App. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 729 (Il1. 1987).
' See A.L. Pickens Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 650 F.2d 118, 120 (6th
Cir. 1981) (Extraneous evidence used if term is "reasonably subject to more than one
interpretation."); Belcher v. Elliott, 312 F.2d 245, 247 (6th Cir. 1962) (Extraneous evidence
used if a contract term does not "clearly express" parties' intent.); REsTATEmENr (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 212 comments b and c (1981).
112 KFC Corp. v. Darsam Corp., 543 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (parol evidence
may not vary or contradict writing); Anderson v. Britt, 375 S.W.2d 258 (Ky. 1963) ("[P]arol
evidence may not be admissible to contradict or vary provisions of writing."); Goldstein v.
McDonald, 3 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1928) (terms of written contract expressing parties' intent
cannot be varied by parole evidence). See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-
202:48.
" R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-202:47.
"4 Id. at § 2-202:67.
Id. at § 2-202:53.
"4The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214, supra note 175, discusses these
and the related rules.
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Inc.,'8 7 proof of custom, and the meaning of a provision in the
syndicate agreement that was copied verbatim from the syndicate
agreements of other stallions, were used to give meaning to the
syndicate agreement under consideration.
The more important inquiry in the horse business is whether
the parol evidence rule applies at all. It must be determined whether
the contract involved is an "integrated agreement" or an integra-
tion intended to express all the terms of the agreement between the
parties. 18 If "the parties did not assent to the writing as a complete
and accurate integration of their contractual relations," the parol
evidence rule does not apply. 89 In determining whether an inte-
grated agreement has been made, the parol evidence rule does not
apply and "any competent evidence is admissible." 190 The otherwise
unsatisfactory case of Alpert'9' properly applied these rules to the
case of a stallion that would not breed. 92
The doctrine would seem particularly applicable in the context
of auctions, where there is much conversation in the stable area
before the auction occurs, and where the auctioneer "puffs" before
or during the bidding.' 93 Apparently most conditions of sale at
auctions do not explicitly prohibit deals apart from their own
terms. After all, the bidder only impliedly accepts the conditions
of sale by entering his or her bid. 94 To the contrary, however, is
the rule stated in Travis:
95
While we need not rule on the vitality of Berg v. Stromme in
other contexts we decline to extend it to auctions. There are in
- 198 A.2d 277 (Md. 1964).
M See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981); R. ANDERSON, supra note
15, at § 2-202:36.
,,9 Johnson v. Dalton, 318 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Ky. 1958).
M Murphy v. Torstrick, 309 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1958).
,9, 643 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Vt. 1986).
"~ Id. at 1415.
,93 See cases cited infra notes 514-61.
,14 RESTATEMENT (SEcoN ) OF CONTRACTS § 28, comment e (1981):
The terms on which goods are to be sold at auction are often made known in
advertisements or catalogues or posted at the place where the auction is to be
held. When the goods are put up, the auctioneer commonly refers to such
terms, and sometimes he announces a modification of the published terms.
Ordinarily bidders are or should be aware of terms so published or announced.
A bid need not repeat such terms; it is understood as embodying them. Hence
the bidder is held to the published or announced terms, even though he may
have neglected to read them or may have arrived at the auction after the
announcement was made. Theoretically, a bidder could make an offer on
terms different from those announced, but bidders seldom or never do so.
195 759 P.2d 418 (Wash. 1988)
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auctions no negotiations .... As sellers state, part of the eco-
nomic rationale of an auction is to avoid face-to-face negotia-
tions. It is a cost-saving device in which face-to-face negotiations,
except as to price, are not engaged in by the parties.'96
The author of this Article believes that the "true economic
rationale of an auction" is not that suggested by the Washington
court, 97 although it is a close question. Private oral deals undoubt-
edly create some dislocation leading to an imperfect market, quite
different than the markets for securities and commodities where
all buyers and sellers are operating on the same assumptions.
Nonetheless, a horse auction is only one type of sale in any horse
industry, one part of a broader market for the sale of eminently
non-fungible goods. A different result is made essential by a com-
bination of (a) the uniqueness of the equine asset (and the decision-
making process of individual buyers and sellers), and (b) the need
to establish public integrity for the horse business by enforcing
fully proven oral deals. The president of America's most wide-
ranging horse auction company agrees: "If the consignor wants to
make a private treaty (warranty) outside our conditions, that is
fine. The ultimate deal is between seller and buyer."' 9
Finally, it should be noted that a typical merger clause' 99 in a
written contract falls within this body of law and simply provides
an agreement or evidence of an agreement to be bound solely by
the writing. The parties have agreed that the parol evidence rule
will apply in full force to the fully integrated agreement. Such
clauses are on the borderline between the parol evidence rule and
the rules applied to disclaimers, both as to conscionability and
rules of construction. Thus, a merger clause may operate even as
an effective disclaimer of fraud. 200 On the other hand, the sale of
worthless property, whose worthlessness is based upon an "inher-
ent, non-observable defect," may be unrebuttably unconscionable
despite the "principle of merger.' '201
1' Id. at 422.
197 See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
'9 Bowen, Setting Out to Conduct a "Squeaky Clean" Sale, TIM BLOOD-HoRSE (Au-
gust 19, 1989) (quoting Fasig-Tipton President Timothy Cone).
'19 No prior or contemporaneous agreements shall be binding on either party.
See supra notes 78-119 and infra notes 514-61 and accompanying text. See I J.
WmTE & R. Sum,.Rs, supra note 30, at 124 et seq. for "ways around" a merger clause.
201 Borden v. Litchford, 619 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
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L Custom
Custom and usage will be given effect in a particular context,
or given effect in a particular way, largely because of the public
policy considerations a court views as being important in the par-
ticular transaction. Thus, the partially expressed and partially unex-
pressed reason for determining the "reasonable" time of inspection
in Miron v. Yonkers 2 is that the custom adopted by that court
presents an easy and straightforward way of promoting contractual
rights. Custom tends to place the burden of investigation only
where it can fairly be discharged; this is an area of law where
custom has operated effectively for a long period of time without
the intervention of competing statutory policy.2 3
Public policy considerations can be the only explanation for
the almost wholly unsatisfactory opinion in Alpert.20 4 The court
found it to be "customary in the industry to have a breeding
soundness guarantee" where an Arabian horse is sold for com-
mercial breeding. 25 The court properly enforced an oral guarantee,
made contemporaneously with an "as is" written sale.2
Despite immediate breeding problems, however, the buyers
waited five months to advise the sellers that there was a problem
and to perform the first medical examination on the unsuccessful
stallion. In order to determine that the buyers spent the five month
period under the "reasonable assumption" that the problem would
be cured, and that the buyer was "reasonably induced" by the
seller to postpone further action,207 the court cited assurances and
discussions held after the five months had run.
208
The court was quite correct 2°9 in saying that the buyer did not
refuse to conduct its own investigation prior to sale so as to exclude
an implied warranty of merchantibility. 210 Indeed, the court cor-
rectly refers to Miron to provide the correct test on the question
of reasonableness. 211 The court, however, did not rely on the cus-
2 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968). See infra notes 551-61 and accompanying text.
203 See Miller, supra note 17, at 817-18.
643 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Vt. 1986).
20 Id. at 1409.
21 See supra notes 168-201 and accompanying text.
These factors are made dispositive by U.C.C. § 2-608 (1988).
Alpert, 643 F. Supp. at 1418. Contrast such facts with those in O'Shea v. Hatch,
640 P.2d 515 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982), where the buyer's actions were patently more reason-
able.
643 F. Supp. at 1417.
2,0 U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) comment 8.
21, 643 F. Supp. at 1418.
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tom in the industry to determine reasonable behavior.2 1 2 Surely
there would have been no proof of a custom to ignore perfectly
patent infertility for five months. The court's support comes only
from the notion that "injustice can be avoided only by rescission
of the contract.' '213 A Vermont purchaser was thus protected by a
Vermont court from what the court must have believed to be a
disreputable Arizona seller. Certainly the horse industry would be
better served if courts were forthright about using public policy
considerations to decide questions of reasonableness rather than
using custom as pretext.
Though the Washington Supreme Court in Travis overruled the
state Court of Appeals only on the issue of disclaimers of implied
warranties, an interesting difference between the cases involves their
analysis of the custom. 2 4 The Court of Appeals criticized the
seller's pre-sale activities with respect to the horse in question,
which "was touted as one of the best yearlings in the state, with
great prospects to win, even though there had been no physical
examination required or administered. ' 21 5 The lower appellate court
said that "representations such as these were standard practice with
the Washington Horse Breeders; its annual Summer Yearling Sale
had been conducted the same way for many years," and a jury
could find a great "impact on the public interest" by such improper
behavior.2 1 6 It was, held the intermediate court, a perfect case to
find unconscionability-presumably because buyers in the locale
had no choice but to come to that sale.217
Washington's highest court, noting the same practice, its influ-
ence on new buyers, and the fact that such selling practices were
the custom and usage of the trade, stated the more modest conclu-
sion that the practices had a "capacity to deceive a substantial
portion of the public" under Washington's unfair trade practice
act. 218 Would that more limited conclusion provide a reason to
support conscionability if an implied warranty disclaimer were
involved? The impact on the public interest was a statutory pre-
requisite under the specific consumer protection statute, and could
212 The court in Forbis v. Reilly 684 F. Supp at 1321, did so..
213 Alpert, 643 F. Supp. at 1420.
214 Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Ass'n, Inc., 734 P.2d 956 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987).
21 Id. at 959.
216 Id.
217 See supra notes 78-119 and accompanying text.
28 759 P.2d at 423.
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not be used offensively by the seller in that case-especially when
many new buyers were included at the sale. 219 Without such a
statute, however, and if predominantly experienced horsemen (who
are expected to know the custom of puffing) are involved, the
result might be different.
J. Proof of Damages
In horse cases, most dissatisfied buyers attempt to void the
transaction rather than to seek damages. Buyers do not want half
the horse they bargained for-at any price.22 The threshold ques-
tion, whose answer will vary depending on the jurisdiction whose
law applies to the subject, would be whether to ask for only
rescission-type relief in the initial complaint-under the threat of
having elected only one remedy.2' 1
The law of damages and the fashioning of remedies generally
is a body of law unto itself and requires more than a paragraph
in a law journal article. Special attention is frequently given to the
fact that quality horses have at least two values-a value for racing
or performance, and a value for breeding. 22 As with other prop-
erty, proof of damages must be made with reasonable certainty.?23
As elsewhere in the law, proof of such technical questions will be
placed by courts in the hands of experts,2 4
What impresses one most often in horse cases is reading the
bizarre assumptions that courts sometimes make. An Oklahoma
219 Id.
m This is the converse of the rules about specific performance, for which see Laycock,
The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HAiv. L. Rav. 687 (1990), especially pages
691 and 706 ("fungible goods ... livestock").
221 See, e.g., Annotation, Conclusive Election of Remedies as Predicated on Com-
mencement of Action, or its Prosecution Short of Judgment on the Merits, 6 A.L.R. 2d 10
(1949); U.C.C. § 2-721 (remedies for fraud); R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-711:9. It
may be that the second sentence of U.C.C. § 2-721 applies to more than fraud, though the
section's title suggests it is limited to fraud. See also U.C.C. § 2-720.
" White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 389 N.Y.S.2d 724, 728 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). See infra
notes 391-605 and accompanying text.
"I See Kahl v. Frederick, 397 N.W.2d 46 (Neb. 1986). See generally R. ANDERSON,
supra note 15, at § 2-715:11 (speculative damages) and :33 (damages for animals).
"4 See Strauss v. West, 216 A.2d 366 (R.I. 1966) (great weight was given to the
plaintiff's trainer's testimony regarding the condition of the horse at time of sale). See
generally Watjen v. Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co., 29 F.2d 801, 802 (6th Cir. 1928)
(market value is a matter of personal knowledge to be proven by witnesses acquainted with
the facts); Erwin v. TriState Plumbing & Heating Corp., 267 S.W.2d 946, 947 (Ky. 1954)
(testimony by expert witness as to fair charge for materials and labor was given considerable
weight); Annotation, Elements and Measure of Damages for Breach of Warranty in Sale
of Horse, 91 A.L.R. 3d 419 (1979).
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court, for example, in Denton v. Winner Communications, Inc.,225
punishes a breeder for not supplying the plaintiff with four breed-
ings to his stallion-"depriving him of four colts for the year,
each of which would have been worth around $29,000.''26 Needless
to say, the court received no proof that four conceptions would
have occurred, nor that four foals would have been born, nor that
all would have been colts, nor that the live colts would have had
straight legs-much less (absent even proof as to who their mothers
would have been) that each would have been worth the same
amount of money. Again, an Illinois court in Lundberge7 allowed
"plaintiffs' expert [to] value five foals" that were never born or
conceived,2 8 and upheld the jury "in accepting one witness's val-
uation of damage over another's." ' 9 In neither case could one say
that the value of unconceived foals had any reasonable certainty.
The correct rule is set out in Schleicher v. Gentry,210 where the
damages were held to be the value of the lost breeding right, not
of some speculative Derby winner.
In the case of warranties, the general measure of damages under
the U.C.C.231 and prior law232 "is the difference at the time and
place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and
the value they would have had if they had been as warranted"
plus special damages in special circumstances. 233 This is always the
rule where "expectation interest" is based on "value. ' ' 2 4 Mc-
Clure,235 for example, holds that where a horse is transferred as a
result of a misrepresentation, the "pecuniary loss is measured by
the difference between the value of the thing received and the
purchase price. ' 236 Where the property was not received, "special
or consequential damages" must be proven.237
Perhaps the most interesting horse case that departs from this
rule is Mizan Arabians v. Pyramid Society.238 Mizan Arabians is
m 726 P.2d 911 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
26 Id. at 916.
502 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
22 Id. at 810.
21 Id. at 814.
230 554 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
-1 U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
232 Wood v. Ross, 26 S.W. 148 (Tex. 1894).
-3 U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1972).
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
25 674 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
236 Id. at 222.
23 Id.
-- 821 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1987).
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undoubtedly an expression of the principle that auctioneers have
duties higher than other parties. In that case, the auction company
accidentally "knocked down" an Arabian horse at a price lower
than its "reserve." 9 That is, a consignor's animal was sold at a
price lower than was authorized. The trial court and the Sixth
Circuit rejected expert testimony as to the actual value of the horse,
and awarded the consignor damages based upon the reserve price-
as if it had some relationship to value. The consignor cited a
general treatise24 that supported the court's result, but the pertinent
part of the treatise was based on a misinterpretation of relevant
cases. Under general agency law, and in accordance with the "ex-
pectation" interest rule cited above,241 the Restatement (Second) of
Agency also measures damage in such a situation as "the difference
between the amount received and the value of the property sold at
the time of sale. ' ' 242 The Sixth Circuit explicitly determined, how-
ever, that "the integrity of ... [Kentucky's] leading industry"
required a more punitive rule.243
The permutations of possible special damages24 and the issue
of "cover" 24 are beyond the scope of this Article. The U.C.C.
supplies detailed rules as to what a buyer must do after he or she
has rejected goods in order to protect the goods before they are
returned to the seller.2 " The duty to mitigate damages is covered
by the common law and U.C.C. section 1-103.247 A typical dilemma
for a dissatisfied horse buyer is explained and resolved by Broglie
v. MacKay-Smith:24
Defendants argue that we must conclude that plaintiffs unreason-
ably let damages accumulate for the purpose of reaching the
21 Id. at 358.
m' 7 Am. Ju. 2D, Auctions and Auctioneers § 65 n.23 (1980).
24 See supra note 234.
242 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY § 424 comment g (1958). It also gives an
alternative as "the amount which the agent would have received if he had obeyed the
principal," but that would seem to require proof that the agent would have received a
higher price, a conclusion that cannot be drawn from the fact that the seller placed an
unrealistic "reserve" on the horse.
243 821 F.2d at 360 (citing Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton of Kentucky, Inc., 703 S.W.2d
885, 890 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986)).
2" E.g., R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-710:9, 2-715:34.
24, Id. at § 2-712, et seq.
U.C.C. §§ 2-603, -604.
241 See R. ANDER sON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-714:20, 2-715:27-28 (with a special note
on animal cases).
541 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1976).
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jurisdictional amount, by continuing to keep and care for the
horse instead of mitigating damages by selling it. Plaintiffs con-
tend that there is no market for a lame horse.
We note that had plaintiffs not provided the animal "neces-
sary sustenance, food, drink, or shelter," they could have been
subject to prosecution under [U.C.C. § 2-392]. Plaintiffs had a
right to sell the horse to mitigate damages only "in commercially
reasonable manner," [U.C.C. § 2-706(1)], and what is a com-
mercially reasonable manner in which to sell a lame horse is not
self-evident. Short of sale, plaintiffs can recover reasonable costs
of handling defective goods. [U.C.C. § 715(1)]. In sum, mitiga-
tion of damages is an issue for trial; plaintiff's dereliction, if any,
has not been sufficiently demonstrated to compel the inference
that their claim was not made in good faith.241
K. Declarations of Public Policy
The public duties of participants in horse deals create higher
responsibilities than would ordinarily be charged to participants in
transactions that do not involve an obvious public interest. The
attribution of public duties to major actors in the horse business
is not unique to thoroughbred auction houses, nor limited to the
form in which it has appeared in the recent cases cited elsewhere
in this Article.5 0
Nor does public policy create additional duties only by judicial
fiat. Marsh v. Gentry25' is an example of an extra duty created by
the law of partnerships; but the court in that case had a statute to
guide it, not merely the common law. Similarly, legislative policies
will emphasize or even skew the duties imposed on actors in the
sales of horses and horse interests. The duties imposed on the sale
of a security under federal and state law, for example, create
substantial additional burdens on certain sellers. Although Kefalas
v. Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc.252 seems to have put to rest the notion
that the most common form of a stallion breeding syndicate is a
security, that case stands on its particular documentation. To the
'A' Id. at 455.
- For example, a draft horse registry has duties "not merely to those who present
horses for registry, but also to the public," which denies to such a party "the right to show
there was no intent to defraud." Howard v. National French Draft Horse Ass'n, 151 N.W.
1056, 1060 (Iowa 1915).
-- 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982). For a more detailed discussion of. this case, see infra
notes 321-24 and accompanying text.
21 630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
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extent that syndicates have as a major component the sharing of
common profits, Kefalas will not be of help to a seller who does
not comply with federal and state securities laws.253 Similarly, only
to the extent that such stallion shares are purchased for use in a
business will their markets not be subject to commodities regula-
tion.2
4
Other legislative declarations of policies also have potential
importance. The antitrust laws impact numerous types of horse
sales, 255 though Stratmore v. GoodbodyM6 determined on its unique
facts that a popular form of restriction on the open sale of syn-
dicate shares did not violate federal antitrust laws. More important,
almost every state has a consumer protection act; some of them
apply to business transactions,2 7 and some of them do not.258 The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,2 9 the major federal "consumer"
legislation in this field, must also be kept in mind. It is a common
theme of this Article that public policy concerns appear often-
but are called a hundred different things.
L. Where Suit is Filed and What Law Applies
In interstate and international businesses like most branches of
the horse industry, choices of forum and choices of law are often
"I See, e.g., Campbell, Racing Syndicates as Securities, 74 Ky. L.J. 691 (1985);
Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 113 (1982); Note, Horse Syndicates
as Securities Under Blue Sky Laws, 74 Ky. L.J. 863 (1986); Comment, Equine Syndications:
Are They Securities?, 6 N.KY. L.R. 361 (1979); Campbell, The Impact of State and Federal
Securities Laws on Horse Syndicates, UNIv. oF Ky. EQUINE LAw SEuMNAR (1986); Kegley,
"The Use of Regulation D in Horse Deals," University of Kentucky Equine Law Seminar
(1986).
2' Cf. C.F.T.C. v. Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 579 (9th Cir. 1982)
(The distinction of a commodity "futures contract" depends on whether the contract is
entered into "merely for speculative purposes and ... are not predicated upon the expec-
tation that delivery of the actual commodity by the seller to the original contracting buyer
will occur in the future.").
"I See generally Finklestein, Anti-trust Law Revisited to the Horse Industry, UIv. oF
KY. EQUINE LAW SEMINAR (1987).
-6 866 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1989).
2-7 TEx. Bus. & CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987) exempts businesses with more
than $25,000,000 in assets.
M' Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 600 S.W.2d
459 (Ky. 1970). See generally Cohan, The Uniform Commercial Code as Applied to Implied
Warranties of "Merchantability" and" Fitness" in the Sale of Horses, 73 Ky. L.J. 665,
686 (1984-85); Annotation, Right to Private Action Under State Consumer Protection Act,
62 A.L.R. 3d 169 (1975).
-9 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2312 (1983); Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 16
C.F.R. §§ 700, 701.1(b) (1989).
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dispositive. They should be considered at the planning stage of
difficult, complex transactions. A detailed examination of such
matters is beyond the scope of this Article, but no discussion of
horse transactions can avoid the flavor of their broad geographic
scope. Especially excluded but nonetheless important in many si-
tuations is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, except to say that if each of the two
parties to a contract lives in a different contracting country, the
convention automatically applies. The convention, however, does
not apply to auctions, can easily be avoided by an express agree-
ment, and has been well and fully treated elsewhere. 260
One must, at the outset, be in a position to file a lawsuit
against a proposed defendant. The United States Constitution re-
quires some minimum contact between a proposed defendant and
the chosen forum. 261 Most states have long arm statutes that go to
the breadth of their constitutionally-permitted jurisdiction; and
federal as well as state courts base the reach of their personal
jurisdiction on local statutory authority. 262 Typically most local
courts will "exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the persons...
transacting any business" in the jurisdiction. 26
The second, more complex, hurdle for a plaintiff is to show
that the forum that exercises personal jurisdiction is nonetheless
the correct venue for the action to proceed, an inquiry that may
involve the statutes of several states, and Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins26 questions when the action is filed in federal court. In
addition, the documentation in horse transactions (e.g., the sale
contract or the auction's conditions of sale) will often include a
forum selection clause.2 65 The modern rule, applicable in arms
length business transactions, allowing (in fact encouraging) the
Beck, Purchase and Sale of Equine Assets Under United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Univ. of Ky. Equine Law Seminar (1989).
211 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). A recent horse case
that sets out the burdens of showing personal jurisdiction over the parties is Ammon v.
Kaplow, 468 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Kan. 1979).
16 See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining, 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
-3 K.R.S. § 454.210; see also In re Air Crash Disaster, 660 F. Supp. 1202, 1210 (W.D.
Ky. 1987) (jurisdiction may be exercised as to claims arising out of or relating to a person's
purposeful activities or where the suit has a substantial connection).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20 See G. A. Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 149 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (contractual venue provision was enforceable where there was equal bargaining
power, forum was reasonable, and no fraud or undue influence).
[VOL. 78
SALE OF HORSES
parties to agree on an appropriate forum is particularly appropriate
to the horse business, and is clearly enforceable in federal courts. 266
In order to uphold the forum selection clause, its enforceability
can be characterized either as a procedural or a contract law
question for choice of law purposes-if the forum jurisdiction
allows enforceability of choice of law selection by contract. 267 Even
if there is a potential for a lawsuit in an unfavorable jurisdiction
that will not allow the parties to choose their forum, the parties
can arrange the substance of the transaction to force venue in a
chosen forum. For example, the parties can provide for payment
of the purchase obligation by a note payable in the jurisdiction of
their choice, and thus allow themselves to choose a venue for an
action on the note.
268
Moyglare Stud Farm, Ltd. v. Due Process Stable, Inc. 269 is a
horse case applying the federal venue statute to diversity actions.
It sets out the various possibilities and typical authorities. In ad-
dition, one must recall the statutes under which state-filed cases
are removed to federal courts270 and under which federal diversity
suits are transferred to other federal courts. 271
Choice of substantive law is a subject with even more permu-
tations. The modern rule suggests that in the sale of horses and
other chattels, the presumptive choice is the place where the chattel
is delivered-but that a choice of law provision in the contract will
control if the jurisdiction whose law is chosen has a substantial
interest in the question involved. 272 Some states, however, do not
give effect to the contract's choice of law provision, 273 analyzing
2 See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See generally Gilbert,
Choice of Form Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L.J. I (1976-77).
26 See Taylor, 474 F. Supp. at 147 n.2.
m Fidelity Union Life Ins. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. 1972). See also Wade
v. Darring, 511 S.W.2d 320 (rex. 1974). See generally RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) CoNFLIcT oF
LAW §§ 53-55, 80 (1971) ("The parties' agreement as to the place of the action will be
given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable.").
569 F. Supp. 1565 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
- 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1451 (1982).
-' 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1982).
r2 See RE STATEXMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICT OF LAW § 191 (1971); see also First Commerce
Realty Investors v. K-F Land Co., 617 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (express agreement
that the laws of a particular state will govern will be given effect if the contract bears a
reasonable relation to the chosen state).
21 Harris Corp. v. Comair, Inc., 712 F.2d 1069 (6th Cir. 1983); Breeding v. Massa-
chusetts Indemnity & Life Ins., 633 S.W.2d 717 (Ky. 1982); Paine v. La Quinta Motor
Inns, 736 S.W.2d 335 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
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every situation in accordance with the "most significant relation-
ship" to the question to be addressed.
274
Several important horse cases have focused on these questions.
In a recent federal case in Virginia, Madaus v. November Hill
Farm, Inc. ,275 the importance of delivery of possession of the horse
was recognized. Delivery generally is a solid point in the course of
performance, a moment at which it is appropriate to transfer title
and/or the risk of loss-and consequentially to determine the place
where the rights between the parties should be fixed.2 76 The Re-
statement (Second) of Conflicts of Law recognizes that if there is
contemplated by the contract a continuing relationship between the
parties, the place of that continuing relationship can be more
dominant than the usually-conclusive place of initial delivery.277 A
recent horse case in the federal court in Vermont, Alpert, stretched
that continuing relationship to (or beyond) its limits by including
not only the continuing relationship contemplated by the contract
but also the continuing relationship occasioned by the dispute that
gave rise to the litigation.
278
McClure279 held that choice of law in contract situations is
based on contacts, and that there are several listed factors that
mandated the application of California law. The court noted2 0 that
there was no question but that Texas law applied to a related fraud
claim-based on telephone conversations, both sides of which were
in Texas. 1
II. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF AoENCY-INTRODUCTION
It is a rare transaction in any branch of the horse business that
does not involve the intervention of agents for one or both parties.
Agency matters, therefore, deserve to be treated separately, though
they reflect and carry forward many of the general points made in
24 See generally R. ANDErSON, supra note 15, at § 3-101:38-:43, :74 and §§ 2-101:19,
2-316:16.
27, 630 F. Supp. 1246 (W.D. Va. 1986) (forum selection clause in a towning contract
is binding unless it is shown to be unreasonably unfair, or unjust).
276 Id. at 1248. See supra notes 44-77 and accompanying text.
2- See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CoNrFLcT OF LAW, § 191 comment f.
27, See also Moyglare Stud Farm, Ltd. v. Due Process Stable, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1565,
1567 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Federal courts need not "blindly apply an overly-restrictive state
statute.").
211 674 F. Supp. 211, 215 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
Id. at 215-16.
211 Id. at 219 n.2.
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other sections of this Article. It is not surprising that many of the
cases cited heretofore, and many of the cases involving the quality
of horses discussed hereafter, are also cited in these sections.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency 2 2 defines the agency re-
lationship as "the fiduciary relation which results from the mani-
festation of consent by one person to another that the other shall
act on his behalf and subject to his control and consent by the
other so to act."n' Agency is thus a consensual matter that is
governed internally by the terms of the parties' agreement if there
is one. Often, however, the consent arises by implication, arising
out of the acts of the parties, as is common in the horse business.
2
1
4
As the succeeding sections note, an agent has enormous power to
subject his or her principal to personal liability on a contract, or
to create liability in tort; and the agent can also divest the principal
of an interest in a horse, or acquire a horse for the principal. 285
This exposure is warranted because of both the giving of consent
and agency's second essential characteristic, viz., that the principal
has the right to control the agent's conduct with respect to matters
falling within the scope of the agency relationship.
286
A. Relation Between Principal and Agent
The fiduciary relationship imposes upon an agent the duty to
act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected
with his or her agency.287 Thus, together with the principal's right
to control the acts of the agent, the paramount and universally
enforced duties of loyalty and good faith of an agent dominate
their relationship. Those two duties include the duty to account
for any personal profits arising from the relationship, the duty not
to act as (or for) an adverse party, and the duty not to compete.
The U.C.C., which governs many aspects of horse sales, has not
displaced common law agency concepts; indeed, they are expressly
recognized by U.C.C. section 1-103.28 The U.C.C. of course does
not control the agency contract itself. 9
E2 R STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCIES § 1(1) (1958).
23 Id.
2" Smith, Implied and Conditional Consent in the Sale of Horse Shares or Seasons,
74 Ky. L.J. 839 (1985-86); Miller, supra note 17.
283 RESTATEMmNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 12 comment c (1958).
"6 Id. at §§ 13-14.
21 Id. at §§ 13, 387.
2" See generally, J. WHITE & R. StumisS, supra note 30, at § 2.
29 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-201:48.
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It is appropriate to give a sense of the breadth of agency
relationships in the horse business by describing some of the prin-
cipal ones. In many transactions, two or three types of agents will
be involved. Although agency relationships tend to give rise to the
same sorts of rights and liabilities, there are some distinctions that
can be drawn.
One common characteristic of agents and principals in the horse
business is the inconsistency of their positions. In respect to some
horses and some transactions, a party may act as the agent of
another party with whom he or she does a different sort of business
at different times. Thus, a syndicate manager acts as a fiduciary
for people with whom he or she competes as a breeder. Each owns
his or her own mares, and shares in other stallions. Bloodstock
agents may regularly act for a buyer, and yet sell horses to that
buyer for other principals (or for themselves) on as many occasions.
The fluidity of the horse business creates a problem for its parti-
cipants: they forget that agency relationships are different. High
fiduciary duties change the fundamental nature of their responsi-
bilities to each other from transaction to transaction. Though it is
difficult for competitors to shift gears, courts clearly will require
them to do so, at the risk of enormous liabilities.
1. Bloodstock Agent
A bloodstock agent typically acts as an intermediary in the
purchase or sale of a horse or horse interest, acting on behalf of
either a buyer or seller. Customarily, a bloodstock agent is paid a
commission as compensation for his or her skill in the evaluation
and marketing of the horse or horse interest, and for his or her
efforts in finding the willing buyer or seller. Due to ongoing or
previous relationships and transactions, it is at times difficult to
ascertain for whose benefit an agent is acting, but an agent cannot
purport to act for both the buyer and seller unless both the buyer
and seller know and consent to the dual role. This general rule, as
applied specifically to bloodstock agents, is made clear in Beasley
v. Trontz.290 In Beasley, a bloodstock agent had an ongoing rela-
tionship with Trontz involving co-ownership of interests in thor-
oughbreds. Beasley contacted the agent to package and sell a mare
and filly. Both the agent and Trontz inspected the mare and filly,
after which the agent memorialized his agency contract with Beasley
- 677 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
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in a letter, including provision for his five percent commission.
The letter was signed by Beasley. Beasley decided not to consum-
mate the deal and Trontz and the agent sued for specific perform-
ance.
The agent explained in his deposition that he was acting as
agent for both buyer and seller. The court held that if he acted
for both without the consent of both, the seller could rescind the
sale even if no bad faith was exercised. 291 The agent would also be
required to forfeit his commission.
As stated earlier, a principal may be deemed to have the
knowledge of, and may be held liable for the actions of his agent.
For example, in Keck v. Wacker,292 an innocent principal was held
liable for the misstatement placed by his agent in the catalog for
the sale of a horse at auction. If the two principles in Beasley had
consented to the dual representation, each would be bound by the
agent's knowledge and acts; 293 and in the appropriate case, consent
could be supplied by custom.
294
2. Auctioneer
The auctioneer prepares the catalog, extends credit to purchas-
ers, creates the rules of the sale, and administers many facets of
the relationships among the parties. In an auction sale, the seller
and buyer frequently do not meet except through the agency of
the auctioneer. 295 Initially, an auctioneer is considered the agent
for the seller. 296 Following the sale, the auctioneer, now holding
the purchase price, becomes the agent of both parties. 297 As agent,
the auctioneer is subject to all the fiduciary obligations owed by
agents to principals generally. 298 The auctioneer is an exception to
the Beasley rule against dual agency.
299
291 Id. at 894.
413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
"I Newsom v. Watson, 177 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1947); Union Bank v. National Surety
Co., 243 S.W. 13 (Ky. 1972).
I" Miller, supra note 17, at 825-32.
21 See supra notes 120-39 and accompanying text.
29 E.g., United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Becker v.
Crabbe, 4 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1928); Faultersack v. Clintonville Sales Corp., 34 N.W.2d 682
(Wis. 1948). See generally 7 AM JutR 2D Auctions and Auctioneers § 60 (1980); R. ANDER-
SON, supra note 15, at § 2-313:112.
Gossage v. Waddle, 18 S.W.2d 975 (Ky. 1929).
29 State ex rel. Jay Bee Stores, Inc. v. Edwards, 636 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1982).
2" See supra notes 141-67 and 202-18 and accompanying text.
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Auction sales are also a matter of public concern, apart from
the private contractual relationship. 300 The auctioneer's control of
the sale makes him or her a super-fiduciary. Castille v. Folck0'
held that where the horse auctioneer is "the party who makes the
rules of the game," he "expressly ... pledges his own responsi-
bility." 30 2 This notion is perhaps a part of the line of authority
that recognizes extra-contractual duties where gross disparity in
bargaining power exists.
30 3
Auctioneers can also be liable for losses occasioned by their
mere negligence to a bidder, such as failure to ascertain or com-
municate accurate information. In Brodsky v. Nerud,304 the New
York Racing Association failed to ascertain or properly list the sex
of a horse and failed to correct inaccurate information published
about a horse in a claiming race. It was noted in Brodsky that the
purchaser places much reliance on printed material. 05
These notions-the duty to the buyer to make accurate listings
and the super-fiduciary role of the auctioneer-were extended fur-
ther in Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc.3°6 The Kentucky
court held that the auctioneer, which was "one of the Common-
wealth's foremost consignors of breeding stock," had a fiduciary
duty to the purchaser and to the equine industry as a whole to use
ordinary care to ensure that its catalog information was accurate
and as comprehensive as possible. 3° Clearly, Fasig-Tipton did not
consciously undertake such duties; they were imposed as a matter
of public policy in view of the equine industry's preerninence in
Kentucky.' 8 The Chernick court, like the Brodsky court, noted
m id.
3o1 338 So. 2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 333. See In re Martin Fein & Co., 34 Bankr. 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(the status is imposed as a matter of law and not by contract); see also Cruikshank v.
Horn, 386 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (auctioneer has one set of duties that is
contractual and one set of duties imposed based upon agency principles). See generally 7
AM JuR 2D Auctions and Auctioneers, § 63 (1980).
301 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Berkeley v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 221 S.E.2d 882 (W.
Va. 1975) (monopolistic or oligopolistic position of one party); General Elec. Co. v. Martin,
574 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (adhesion contract); see also supra notes 78-119 and
accompanying text.
414 N.Y.S.2d 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
_30 Id. at 40; supra notes 260-81; see also Cruikshank, 386 N.W.2d at 136.
3- 703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
3 Id. at 890.
308 Protecting the public's confidence in an institution is akin to the decisions imposing
fiduciary obligations on banking institutions; see, e.g., Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Bank & Trust
Co., 566 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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that a high degree of reliance is placed by a purchaser upon the
accuracy of Fasig-Tipton's sale catalog information.3°9
In a subsequent case, a federal court, sitting in Kentucky,
agreed that a horse auction company is required to use ordinary
care to ensure that information contained in its catalog is as
accurate and comprehensive as possible. 310 According to that court,
however, a correct and complete reflection of the available records
is where the auctioneer's duty "begins and ends; ' 311 and the court
held that the horse auction company had no fiduciary duty to the
buyer either (a) to inspect and examine a yearling for internal
defects prior to sale or (b) to require the selier to inspect a yearling
for internal defects prior to sale.
3 12
In Mizan Arabians v. Pyramid Society,313 the ordinary rule of
damages is altered for the super-fiduciary to advance the goal of
"maintaining the integrity of Kentucky's leading industry. 31 4 A
contrary ruling "would tend to undermine the confidence of owners
who seek to protect their investment by placing reserve bids.
' 315
This extraordinary rule does not apply to "mere" fiduciaries.
31 6
3. Partners, Co-owners, and Joint Venturers
Partnership is a form of mutual agency, and is governed by
statute in many states.31 7 The partnership relation is governed by
the same general principles that apply to every fiduciary. The
U.C.C., which governs many horse transactions, does not displace
the laws governing the partnership relationship.318 The fiduciary
relationship among partners is a mixture of (a) a consensual un-
dertaking and (b) the status arising out of the contract. A partner
is bound by the fraud or breach of trust of the other. In Eppes v.
Snowden,319 for example, one partner's fraud on the court in an
3" 703 S.W.2d at 890.
31o Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1265, 1273 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
311 Id.
312 Id.
M 821 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1987).
3,, Id. at 360. See supra notes 221-49 and accompanying text.
M Mizan Arabians v. Pyramid Soc., 821 F.2d 357, 360 (6th Cir. 1987).
316 See supra note 242.
317 E.g., K.R.S. 362.165(3), .190.
31, E.g., U.C.C. § 1-103 (1988).
319 656 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
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action on a horse mortality insurance policy was imputed to the
other partner, whose counterclaim was dismissed.
20
The duty of loyalty, and the strictness with which a partner's
conduct will be scrutinized, are demonstrated in the leading case
of Marsh v. Gentry.3 2' In that case, one partner purchased the
partnership's thoroughbred mare (by the bid of a secret agent) at
auction, and purchased a partnership filly through a private sale
to himself without the knowledge and consent of his partner. A
judgment in favor of the purchasing partner was reversed by the
Kentucky Supreme Court, relying on Uniform Partnership Act
section 250(1), which requires every partner to account for any
profit derived without the consent of other partners in a transaction
related to the partnership. 322 The court rejected the defense that
secret bidding was an accepted practice in the industry.32 The
importance of Kentucky's horse industry was invoked by a con-
curring justice, just as it was in Chernick 24
A joint venture is a form of partnership. 32 The duties of those
involved are the same as partners.3 26 Even co-owners may have the
same duties as partners327 and those possibilities should be explored
in the appropriate case.
4. Syndicate Manager/Farm Manager/Trainer
Some agents work in the interest of the principal on a long-
term basis. In the context of the horse business, a syndicate man-
ager's typical duties, for example, include maintaining the stallions'
books, accounting for expenses and income, selection of veterinar-
310 But see Elcomb Coal Co. v. Hall Land & Mining Co., 115 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Ky.
1938) (the law will not create a partnership between parties merely as a consequence of
conduct and dealing that arises out of an existing situation).
32 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982).
31 Id. at 576.
323 Id.
4 Id. at 577 (Palmore, J., concurring). But see Bradshaw v. Thompson, 454 F.2d 75,
80 (6th Cir. 1972) (rule that a sales agent cannot purchase is not applicable where agency
terminated prior to agent's acquisition of interest in property).
321 Jones v. Nickell, 179 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Ky. 1944).
2 In re Perret, 67 Bankr. 757 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1986) (attorney for a creditor went
beyond his status as agent to become joint venturer and was jointly and severally liable
with creditor).
327 Cf. Mason v. Barrett, 174 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1943) (the title of land purchased for
one of several joint owners did not vest in one, but title was taken for the benefit of all
joint owners); Hammonds v. Risner, 132 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1939); Chapman v. Aldridge, 15
S.W.2d 454, 455 (Ky. 1929) (possession of one joint owner inures to the benefit of all joint
owners).
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ians, organization of first refusal notices and draws, advertising,
and fixing a farm price stud fee. Sometimes the syndicate manager
sells one or more nominations to pay for syndicate expenses; and
some syndicates, under the control of the syndicate manager, sell
nominations for the profit of all. Above all, the syndicate manager
keeps contact with everyone interested in a particular stallion,
obtaining all sorts of information about prospective buyers and
sellers of shares and seasons, and possible foal sharing partners.
A syndicate manager (like a farm manager) is involved in many
of the day-to-day operations and transactions on behalf of the
owners of the horse or horse interest. The syndicate manager
ordinarily assumes an agency relationship by contract. More often
than not, such an understanding is recognized by the document
whether the contract calls him or her an agent or a fiduciary. The
document is often prepared under the direction of the syndicate
manager. 312 Most syndicate managers include an exculpatory pro-
vision that purports to relieve them of their implied fiduciary duties
in some or many respects.
The syndicate manager's mere possession of the horse alone
does not create the agency relationship; 29 and possession alone will
not grant the authority to take actions that affect a principal's
interest. "[M]ere possession carries no indication of any right to
engage in transactions of serious consequences to the owner of the
chattel. Possession is as consistent with tortious acquisition as with
full ownership."330 However, the syndicate manager generally un-
dertakes acts of much greater significance that concretely affect
the principal's interest in the horse.
It is clear that syndicate managers are the agents and, thus, the
fiduciaries of the owners to an extent consistent with their con-
tractual undertakings; they also have the same duties as all agents.3 31
"I Ordinarily, syndicate managers see to it that super-majorities are required to remove
them from their position. If not, ordinary employment law will apply, both as to the power
of the syndicate to remove its leader, and as to the damages available on removal. But see
Marks v. Goff, 253 So. 2d 146, 148 (Fla. 1971) (in appropriate circumstances such doctrines
as powers coupled with an interest would apply). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 138 comment d (1958).
I" The same is true if the farm manager or the trainer has possession of the animal.
3" See Lux Art Van Service, Inc. v. Pollard, 344 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1965); see
also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) AGENCY § 200 (1958).
"I Robinson v. Ralph G. Smith, Inc., 735 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1984) (employee, who
was not agent, could not have his negligence imputed to his employer); Fuller v. Peabody,
1 F.2d 965 (6th Cir. 1924) (title of land was vested in trustee along with power of
management and sale; therefore sale was valid and equitable); see also Adrian v. Elmer,
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Each one of the duties assumed by the syndicate manager in the
contract or in practice will give rise to a correlative fiduciary
obligation. Such agents receive enormous amounts of information
about the horse whose possession they keep, and whose activities
they manage, creating duties of disclosure to the principals. 3 32
Fortunately, in practice there has not been a need to litigate, at
least at the appellate level, the limits of these duties.
The extent of a farm manager's role has been litigated in the
context of a third party's reliance on his or her authority. In
Lundberg v. Church Farm, Inc. , 3 1 the parties' respective "experts"
are mentioned-witnesses who gave conflicting testimony as to the
extent of the authority of the manager. 334 Similar to the farm
manager and the syndicate manager, a trainer may not start out
intending to be a general agent, according to the terms of his or
her original undertaking. It is clear, however, that a trainer may
assume a broader agency, as in Clearwater Farms, Inc. v. Roosevelt
Raceway, Inc.
335
5. Summary of Remedies
In all sorts of fiduciary contexts, fiduciaries are liable in con-
tract or tort for any harm suffered by the principal as a result of
a breach.3 36 The fiduciary relationship that exists between principal
and agent is so jealously guarded that a breach of trust by the
agent entitles a principal to void a transaction, even in the absence
of subjective bad faith or actual harm.337 A principal is entitled to
284 P.2d 599 (Kan. 1955) (warranty of bull's siring ability made by farm manager of
livestock farm binding his owner who accepted consideration for sale). See generally Bishop
& Pendorf, Breeding Syndicate Agreements and Strategies, UNIV. OF Ky. EQtUINE LAW
SEmiNAR (1987) (syndicate manager is a fiduciary).
M Any agent "is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal
information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him." RESTATEM:ENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 381 (1958). The fact that a fiduciary "remained silent", standing alone, is
sufficient evidence that he or she "did not act with the confidence and trust required as
fiduciary." San Pedro State Bank v. Engle, 643 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
333 502 N.E.2d 806, 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
34 Id. at 810.
331 500 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (1986).
336 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 399, 401, 401 comment a (1958); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
337 See Beasley v. Trontz, 677 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) ("[A]II transactions
in which the agent has either acted for himself or for a party whose interest is adverse to
his principal are voidable by the principal and may be repudiated by the principal without
a showing that he was injured."); Faultersack, 34 N.W.2d at 683.
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an accounting from his or her agent as a matter of right. 3 8
The agent who breaches his or her fiduciary duty will forfeit
the right to compensation from that transaction, and will be dis-
gorged of any profit received by reason of the offending transac-
tion.339 The agent will also be responsible to the principal by way
of indemnity for any loss suffered by the principal as a result of
the breach.
340
As a general rule, punitive damages are recoverable for outra-
geous acts in order to punish a wrongdoer and to deter others
from engaging in similar conduct. Superlatives such as malicious-
ness, willfulness, wantonness, and fraudulent are typically used to
describe the conduct that exposes the ordinary actor to such pun-
ishment. A breach of fiduciary duty alone, however, may be suf-
ficient to impose punitive damages.
341
All this being said, agents may nonetheless act for themselves
when a conflict of interest exists, if two requirements are satisfied:
full disclosure and consent. Both requirements must be met. A
principal's apparent acquiescence in an agent's transaction will not
defeat the usual remedies. 342 Frequently, both requirements are met
by exculpatory agreements in the document creating the agency
undertaking. As with any trustee, the technical duties of an agent-
fiduciary may be waived-to a degree. Such clauses will be strictly
3 Deaton v. Hale, 592 S.W.2d 127 (Ky. 1979) ("[R]ight of principal to require an
accounting is elementary.").
311 See R. K. Ray Sales v. Genova, 478 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. App. 1985) (agent is not
entitled to compensation for work done during period of willful and deliberate breach);
Swinebroad v. Hester, 289 S.W.233 (Ky. 1926) (auctioneer/agent cannot recover for his
services when he closed sale using a contract materially different from what he represented
to principal); Douglas v. Aztec Petroleum, 695 S.W.2d 312, 319 (Tex. App. 1985) ("It is a
fundamental principle of our law that an agent who acts adversely to his principal or
otherwise breaches his fiduciary obligation is not entitled to compensation for his services.");
Faultersack, 34 N.W.2d at 684 ("In absence of full disclosure of the facts to the principal
he can refuse to pay the commission or recover a commission already paid."). But cf.
Mizan Arabians, 821 F.2d 357 (agent who breached contract by selling horse for less than
bid price entitled to commission as a setoff since denial would amount to punitive damages
and no bad faith or fraud was shown). RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) AGENCY § 456 sets Out one
approach to the problem of apportioning compensation in a complicated relationship.
340 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) AGENCY § 401 comment d (1958).
341 One must examine the jurisdiction's rules about punitive damages on "contract"
claims, and its view of fiduciary duties as a contract matter. See, e.g., Brown v. Coates,
253 F.2d 36 (CA D.C. Cir. 1958); Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 69
F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1934).
-,2 Maxwell v. Bates, 40 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1931) (sale disallowed when realtor/agent
failed to disclose his intentions to purchase owner/principal's home).
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construed,3 43 and cannot, according to the general rule, be extended
to allow acts done in bad faith.344
The same sorts of tests applicable to unconscionability in
general345 ought to be applicable here as well 346-with the added
feature that the fiduciary relationship makes the burden higher on
the apparently exculpated party. Indeed, it may be that in states
where stallion syndicates are particularly important, the syndicate
manager may be a super-fiduciary like an auctioneer.
B. Relation To Third Parties
Acts of an agent can satisfy the statute of frauds so as to make
obligations binding on the principal.3 47 As a general proposition,
acts of an agent are binding on the principal vis-a-vis third parties
if they are done with the actual authority of the principal, express
or implied, or if they are done with the apparent, but not actual,
authority of the principal 4.3
Apparent authority arises when the principal knowingly or
negligently permits another to assume the agent's role. In such
cases, a principal is bound by a contract made by the agent, even
if the deal conflicts with the principal's express instructions. 349 In
addition, there is the related rule that the principal cannot accept
"the fruit of the agent's [unauthorized] work ... without taking
it subject to its infirmities. "350 This rule applies more narrowly to
34 3 W. FRATCHER, ScoTT ON TRUSTS § 222.2 (1986).
3" Id.
3" See supra notes 79-119 and accompanying text.
346 The inability to bargain for the terms of an agreement will be especially important
in this situation. One can only obtain a breeding right to a particular stallion from an
established syndicate agreement.
347 See supra notes 141-67 and accompanying text.
3" These are the functions that most directly impact the general principles of sales of
horses or horse interests, and the provisions regarding the quality of the horse. See supra
notes 3-281 and infra notes 392-605 and accompanying text.
3 See Lundberg v. Church Farm, Inc., 502 N.E.2d 806 (Ill. App. 1986) (terms of live
foal contract signed by farm manager were binding on owner/seller where the owner held
agent out to prospective buyers as possessing such authority).
I" Western Mfg. Co. v. Cotton & Long, 104 S.W. 758 (Ky. 1907); see also Adrian,
284 P.2d at 603 (having accepted and retained consideration for sale of bull, farm manager's
warranty of siring ability binding upon seller whether authorized or not on theory of
ratification). Compare Robinson, 735 F.2d at 191 (jury issue existed as to whether groom
of horse owner had apparent authority to sign bill of lading limiting carrier's liability when
horse injured in transit) with Lux Art Van Service, 344 F.2d 888 (possession of mare by
operator of stud farm, with owner's consent, did not give operator apparent authority to
ship mare back to owner; therefore, the limitation of liability in bill of lading signed by
operator's employee was not binding on owner).
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partnerships,35' presumably because of the unauthorized partner's
personal interest in the enterprise.
Apparent authority, requiring both (a) the principal's knowl-
edge of the agent's activities or position and (b) reliance by the
third party on the activities or position, is also referred to as
agency by estoppel. Agency by estoppel is an extension of the
equitable maxim that where one of two innocent persons must
suffer from the wrongful act of another, the party who put the
wrongdoer in the position to commit the act is chargeable with its
consequences. 352 However, aside from instances where fraud is
practiced by an agent upon a third party (in which case the third
party's negligence is said to be less objectionable than the fraud),
35 3
the third party cannot close his or her eyes to known or apparent
limitations on an agent's authority. The reliance element of estop-
pel would be missing.
The scope of actual authority is not always simple to determine.
An agent hired for one purpose, for example, does not have implied
(or even apparent) authority to bind his or her principal in matters
unconnected with the scope of the initial agency.354 The limits of
actual agency are the limits of the consensual relationship between
the parties. Thus, the court in the important horse case of McClure
v. Duggan35" dismissed out of hand the notion that an insurance
agent could bind his principal to a purported contract for the sale
of a thoroughbred race horse.35 6 Custom may also define the limits
of authority granted by a principal.
35 7
An agent who is hired to consign and sell a horse makes
warranties or representations to a buyer that are binding on the
3,I A partner who accepts a benefit individually does not necessarily bind the partner-
ship, even if the partnership benefits from the transaction. George Bohon Co. v. Moren &
Sipple, 152 S.W. 944 (Ky. 1913); see also Ogallala Fertilizer Co. v. Salsbery, 184 N.W.2d
729 (Neb. 1971); Brewer v. Elks, 133 S.E.2d 159 (N.C. 1963); First State Bank of Riesel v.
Dyer, 254 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. 1953). The preceding cases, together with Mitchell v. Whaley,
92 S.W. 556 (Ky. 1906), establish a presumption: when a deal is made in the name of an
individual partner, it is presumed that it is solely his or her contract, and not that of the
partnership.
'1. See Gordon v. Pettingill, 96 P.2d 416, 418 (Colo. 1939); Kentucky-Pennsylvania
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Clark, 57 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Ky. 1933).
35 Western Mfg. Co., 104 S.W. at 760.
3 But see Clearwater Farms, Inc. v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 500 N.Y.S.2d 311
(1986).
35, 674 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
35 Id. at 217.
11 Occhuizzo v. Perlmutter, 426 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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seller. 358 For example, information erroneously printed by the New
York Racing Association in the track's racing program regarding
the sex of the horse in a claiming race constituted an express
warranty of the seller. 359 Extra-Code law will govern issues related
to an agent's authority to make warranties. 360 In dicta, one court
noted that if the agent had been guilty of fraud, the horse owner
would be liable, "even though he did not know of the misrepre-
sentation. ' 361 Note that the knowledge possessed by the agent of
matters falling within the scope of the agency is also imputed to
the principal; 362 but the attribution of knowledge to the principal
is not (and should not be) without limit.
As a general rule, it has been held that an agent's purchase or
sale of goods on account of his or her principal is binding and
effective to pass title to the horse, as in Grandi v. Thomas.363 That
case, however, combines the Code's rules on passage of title with
the rules of implied and apparent agency: while the agent's pur-
chase was binding on the principal, the agent did not hold title or
the apparent power to sell-so the agent's unauthorized agreement
to pass title back to seller was ineffective. 64 Moreover, a person
who receives a principal's goods from an agent with notice that
the agent has breached a fiduciary duty holds the property as
constructive trustee. 365
An agent, including an auctioneer, "is under a duty to turn
over proceeds of a sale to the principal and to account for them
311 Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377, 1383 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
"I Brodsky v. Nerud, 414 N.Y.S.2d 38, 41 (1979); see also Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F.
Supp. 1406 (D. Vt. 1986) (seller's agent's assurances concerning a stallion's breeding sound-
ness constituted express warranties binding on the seller, the breach of which entitled buyer
to rescind sale); Slyman v. Pickwick Farms, 472 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (state-
ments by agent for seller concerning yearling's condition constitute warranties binding on
seller).
110 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-313:99-112. See generally, Annotation, Implied
or Apparent Authority of Agent Selling Personal Property to Make Warranties, 40 A.L.R.
2d 285.
36! 413 F. Supp. at 1383.
362 See infra notes 599-605 and accompanying text; Key v. Bagen, 221 S.E.2d 234 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1975) (claim stated against principal on breach of warranty theory when agent
knew the horse was unsuitable for recreational use); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 268-283 (1958).
363 391 P.2d 35 (Kan. 1964).
164 Id. at 38; see also In re Martin Fein, 34 Bankr. at 336 (auctioneer-agent does not
possess title to principal's goods); Cruikshank, 386 N.W.2d 134 (auctiQneer holds funds of
seller-principal as trustee and title rests only in principal).
363 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 314 (1958).
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in full."3es An agent must comply with his or her principal's
instructions in the disposition of proceeds or risk responsibility for
payment. 367 If there are no instructions, the agent must obtain
express consent. In the absence of particular instructions, the duty
to remit proceeds is held to be an absolute one.368 In C.T. Fuller
v. Fasig-Tipton Co., 69 an agent sold a yearling for an owner whose
name was disclosed. Fasig-Tipton deducted from the principal's
sale proceeds amounts owed to Fasig-Tipton by the agent-as well
as amounts owed by another seller for whom the same agent had
sold horses at an earlier Fasig-Tipton sale. Fasig-Tipton was re-
quired by the courts to return the amounts deducted.
C. Rights of Third Party v. Agent
"[O]ne who deals with an agent does so at his own peril, and
must discover the actual scope of his authority, ' 370 but an agent
for a disclosed principal is not personally liable for the principal's
debt, absent evidence of his intent "to substitute or add his per-
sonal liability for, or to, that of his principal." ' 371 That is the
logical consequence of the rule that agents for disclosed principals
have the power to bind their principals to a contract as if the third
party had contracted directly with the principal. 3 2 Any rights or
liabilities that exist between the third party and the agent do not
effect that relationship.
373
An exception to this rule is an agreed practice (including a
custom) of a running account of set-offs among many parties,
"' In re Martin Fein, 34 Bankr. at 336 (An auctioneer is "primarily" the seller's agent
and a fiduciary obligation exists as a matter of law.); see also Cruikshank, 386 N.W.2d
134; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 427 (1958).
"6 Cruikshank, 386 N.W.2d at 134; see also Bank of British N. America v. Cooper,
137 U.S. 473, 479 (1890) ("If positive instructions are disobeyed and loss results, prima
facie liability for that loss ensues ... [S]trict compliances by ... [the agent] with the
instructions of the... [principal] is an unvarying condition of exemption from liability.").
3 For example, in Cruikshank, 386 N.W.2d 134, an auctioneer deposited the seller's
proceeds in a bank account. Subsequently, the bank failed. The agent was held liable for
the full proceeds since by failing to obtain the consent of the seller to have the proceeds
deposited in a bank account. The court's holding was irrespective of any negligence by the
auctioneer. See also Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968) (auc-
tioneer who delivers horse prior to receipt of purchase price in violation of conditions of
sale is liable to seller for purchase price).
- 587 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1978).
370 In re Perret, 67 Bankr. at 775 (quoting Ford v. Unity Hospital, 299 N.E.2d 659,
664 (N.Y. 1973)).
371 Id. at 774 (quoting Meucher v. Weiss, 114 N.E.2d 177 (N.Y. 1953)).
372 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 292 (1958).
31 Id. at § 299.
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which can even allow setoffs against the principal.374 There is an
estoppel caveat here as well: if the principal misleads the third
party, such as by putting goods into the possession of the agent,
the third party may set off any claim he or she has against the
agent.3
7 5
Castille76 provides another rule contrary to the usual non-
liability of the agent to third parties-for the super-fiduciary auc-
tioneer. In that case, a purchaser brought suit against an auctioneer
who represented prior to sale that a broodmare had been "Coggins
Tested".37 7 The auctioneer made repeated honest (but false) repre-
sentations that a Coggins test certificate would be provided upon
sale, even though no certificate had been provided by owner. The
appellate court held that the buyer would ordinarily have no cause
of action against the auctioneer, which it knew was acting as a
mere agent. 378 The court held, however, the auctioneer could be
personally liable in this case as "the party who 'makes the rules
of the game'. ' 3 79 Under those circumstances, the auctioneer had a
duty to ensure the horse met the requirements that the auctioneer
represented.
3
1
0
Where an agent contracts with a third party who is unaware
that the agent is acting for a principal (undisclosed agency), the
principal is liable to the third party-but the third party may look
to the agent as well. 381 The third party's election to charge the
agent does not discharge the principal from liability, even if a
judgment is obtained against the agent. 382 There may be only one
374 Id. at §§ 299 275 (such a custom is discussed at § 299, comment a).
3"1 Id. at § 306(2).
376 338 So. 2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
I" Id. at 331.
171 Id. at 332.
371 Id. at 333 (quoting trial judge who is quoting an unnamed source).
30 Id.; see also Susi v. Belle Acton Stables, Inc., 360 F.2d 704, 714 (2nd Cir. 1986)
(agent's conversion renders principal liable); United States v. Sommerville, 211 F. Supp.
843 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (agent-auctioneer's sale of cows that were subject to recorded security
interest constitutes conversion for which agent is liable); Schulze v. Price, 213 S.W.2d 365,
366-67 (Ark. 1948) (agent not personally liable to third party upon contract for sale of
horse made for disclosed principal); Small v. Ciao Stables, Inc., 425 A.2d 1030, 1032 n.6
(Md. 1981) (in action brought by seller against buyer's agent, agent entitled to summary
judgment since he acted for fully disclosed principal and made no personal contractual
agreement); Slyman v. Pickwick Farms, 472 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (agent who
made warrinties concerning yearling's condition at request of known seller not personally
liable for breach).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 322 (1958).
312 Id. at §§ 209, 210.
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satisfaction." 3 In another contrast to a disclosed principal pattern,
where an agent is authorized to conceal the principal's existence,
the third party may set off a claim against the agent as against
any liability to the undisclosed principal until the existence of the
principal becomes known.
8 4
An agent may also be liable to a third party even when such
party knows the agent is an agent-but the principal's identity is
unknown." 5 The principal is considered "partially disclosed," since
his or her existence, but not identity, is known.38 6 Absent a custom
or agreement to the contrary, the third person has no affirmative
duty to discover the identity of the principal. 3 7 This is an important
variation in the context of horse sales. Often a consignor is asked
to consign a horse under its name, to make use of the consignor's
favorable reputation in the industry. An owner may believe that
the owner's price can be maximized if a consignor with more
experience is involved, albeit disclosing its agency role. The con-
signing agent risks personal liability, as is appropriate.
3
1
8
The converse of this rule is that an agent for a partially dis-
closed principal may enforce the contract and the principal may
be bound by a judgment between the other two, as in Small v.
Ciao Stables, Inc.389 In Small, a seller consigned a filly at Fasig-
Tipton's select two-year-old sale in the name of Thomas Bowman,
D.V.M., Agent. Fasig-Tipton was the agent for the agent; and the
filly was purchased by the buyer's agent. The buyer sued Fasig-
Tipton in New York, skipping over three links in the chain of
agency, obtaining a judgment for rescission. The sellers had knowl-
edge of the suit but made no attempt to intervene. Subsequently,
"' Id. at §§ 209 comment a, 211. See Schulze, 213 S.W.2d at 366-67 (stating general
rule that agent may be personally liable if principal is not disclosed and third party may
elect to hold agent liable even upon disclosure of principal).
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 306 (1958).
U Id. at § 321.
,,6 Orient Mid-East Lines v. Albert E. Bowen, Inc., 458 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1972) (rule
was imposed despite evidence that a freight forwarder always acted exclusively for others).
Id. at 577.
Id. Theoretically, the consigning agent may be able to establish proof of a custom
in the industry that would impose a duty to ascertain the identity of the principal, but
Orient Mid-East Lines establishes that mere knowledge that an agent is acting for another
will not relieve the agent of liability to a third party; see also McElroy v. Long, 170 F.2d
345, 347 (5th Cir. 1948) ("The fact that he is known to be an auctioneer, by profession
selling as an agent for others, is of no import and is no notice that he may not be selling
his own property"). See generally Annotation, Liability of Auctioneer or Clerk to Buyer as
to Title, Condition or Quality of Property Sold, 80 A.L.R.2d 1237, 1241 (1961).
3" 425 A.2d 1030 (Md. 1981).
1989-90]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the sellers sued Fasig-Tipton for the purchase price in Maryland
and obtained a summary judgment. A third action (the reported
case) was filed by the sellers against the purchaser, who also
obtained summary judgment-on grounds of res judicata.390
D. Regulation by Government
Currently, the usual agent's participation in the sale of horses
and interests in horses (bloodstock agents, auctioneers, and ex-
changes) is not regulated in the same manner as real estate agents
and brokers, with the exception of statutes applicable to livestock
auctioneers. However, aside from the civil remedies of the principal
against a defalcating agent, an agent is subject to criminal liability
under some circumstances.3 91
III. PROVISIONS AS TO QUALITY OF THE HORSE-INTRODUCTION
For horses of racing and performing age, matters of confir-
mation are observable, and matters of pedigree are generally avail-
able from the records of breed registries. Defects of bone, and, in
319 The court found that as agent for a partially disclosed principal, Fasig-Tipton was
authorized to sue on the contract. Id. at 1037-38. See RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§ 364 (1958). In fact, the consignment contract authorized Fasig-Tipton to sue on the sales
contract. 425 A.2d at 1037. A consignor could argue that by virtue of the consignment
contract, Fasig-Tipton had a duty to sue and enforce its conditions of sale (or, in this case,
defend). Accord Hewitt v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co., I N.Y.S.2d 292 (1937).
3, Under K.R.S. § 514.070,
a person is guilty of theft by failure to make required disposition of property
received when: (a) He obtains property upon agreement or subject to a known
legal obligation to make specified payment or other disposition whether from
such property or its proceeds or from his own'property to be reserved in
equivalent amount; and (b) He intentionally deals with the property as his
own and fails to make the required payment or disposition.
Under K.R.S. § 518.030,
a person is guilty of receiving a commercial bribe when: (a) As an employee
or agent, and without the consent of his employer or principal, he knowingly
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit from another person upon an
agreement or understanding that the benefit will influence his conduct contrary
to his employer's or principal's best interest; or (b) As a fiduciary, and without
the consent of his beneficiary, he knowingly solicits, accepts or agrees to
accept any benefit from another person upon an agreement or understanding
that the benefit will influence his conduct contrary to his fiduciary obligation.
Additionally, under K.R.S. § 517.110,
a person is guilty of misapplication of entrusted property when he applies or
disposes of property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary ... in a
manner which he knows is unauthorized and involves substantial risk of loss
or detriment to the owner of the property or to a person for whose benefit
the property was entrusted.
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racing breeds, of wind, are usually not observable to the naked
eye. They are discoverable to a large degree by X-rays and endo-
scopic examinations, with more defects being discoverable with
more detailed and lengthy veterinary examinations. As to breeding
animals, a superficial examination can determine whether a horse
is a stallion prospect, or a gelding or ridgeling (a male without
descended testicles in varying degrees), while laboratory examina-
tions can give much (but not complete) information about the
animal's fertility. Libido is determined only in the breeding shed.
As to female breeding animals, the standard physical examination
determines much as to capacities of the reproductive system; and
a long breeding history can suggest the mare's capacity to conceive
and carry a foal to term.
It is readily observed that the racing, performance, and breed-
ing qualities of a horse vary widely as to their discoverability.
Some defects are patent, some latent, and most lay on the wide
spectrum between the two.
The same is true of the sources of information available to the
buyer and seller. Sellers, for example, typically have access to the
animal's medical history, which may, but often will not, reveal a
bone break or chip, a-history of failures of conception or abortion,
and the results of a lifetime of examinations. Sellers have broad
discretion regarding whether to make this information available to
buyers. Equally varied are the standard practices among breeds
and locales, and among private and public sales, as to the inspec-
tion practices of buyers, and the depth of disclosure made by
sellers.
In order to predict the result of any case coming before a
court, it is important for a lawyer to absorb and weigh all the
different pieces of this puzzle in the particular transaction-far
more important than analyzing each separate cause of action that
may be available in a case involving the sale of goods. It is believed
that this result is supported by many cases cited hereafter, and is
in fact the proper outcome-an outcome determined by the nature
of the horse sale transaction. In the discussion that follows, sepa-
rate causes of action are isolated and separate elements and de-
fenses are discussed; but it is hoped that this leads the reader
through the horse sale transaction in a way that makes it under-
standable.
A. Mutual Mistake: The Blending of Cause of Action and Reliance
Since warranties have been discussed at length by other com-
mentators, this Article concentrates on select elements of the war-
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ranty cause of action. We extract the buyer reliance and seller
knowledge elements of all of those and related causes of action,
leaving only bits and pieces for general discussion of the individual
claims. A claim for rescission due to mistake is the purest case of
a buyer-reliance claim and a seller-knowledge circumstance. Mis-
take, after all, is a matter of what is in the minds of the two
parties.
In Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc.,392 the specific matter
before the court was the effect of a warranty disclaimer, but the
analysis goes much further. The buyer purchased a thoroughbred
yearling colt, which he thought was a racehorse without wind
problems. He soon discovered that the yearling had an undi-
agnosed, potentially harmful wind problem. The court held that
because of an unambiguous disclaimer of wind warranties, the
auction's "Conditions of Sale operated to shift the burden of
responsibility for any fortuitous conditions which might arise upon
the buyer. ' 393 Cohen itself cites cases applying this principle to any
situation where the parties have "agreed among themselves; ' 394
and the principle applies to any circumstance where the buyer is
aware that he or she is taking a risk. Beecher v. Able395 quotes
Professor Williston: "[I]n determining whether rescission is war-
ranted in a given circumstance, 'there must be excluded from
consideration mistakes as to matters which the contracting parties
had in mind as possibilities and as to the existence of which they
took the risk'. '"396 The commentator to Restatement (Second) of
Contracts agrees:
c. Conscious ignorance. Even though the mistaken party did not
agree to bear the risk, he may have been aware when he made
the contract that his knowledge with respect to the facts to which
the mistake relates was limited. If he was only so aware that his
knowledge was limited but undertook to perform in the face of
that awareness, he bears the risk of the mistake. It is sometimes
said in such a situation that, in a sense, there was not mistake
but "conscious ignorance.
' 397
192 712 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
" Id. at 1270 (quoting from United States v. Hathaway, 242 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir.
1957)).
39 Id.
" 575 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1978).
19 Id. at 1015 (quoting 13 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1543 (1970)).
"9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 comment c (1981).
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The commentator notes the "close relationship" of mistake
claims to claims of breach of warranty398-a useful connection that
sets the theme of the next few sections of this Article. The separate
causes of action are discussed below without reference to reliance
and intent, and, with that background, the concept of conscious
ignorance will be revisited.
B. Express Warranties
Despite the limitation of its title to "implied warranties," an
earlier article in the Journal serves as the basis for an analysis of
express warranties in horse cases. 399 Thus, the following analysis is
limited in its scope, culminating in a discussion of the warranty of
description, which serves as an express warranty in the horse in-
dustry; however, its effect is similar to that of the implied warranty
in other fields.
Sessa v. Riegle4° and Yuzwak v. Dygert4 1 bring into the mod-
em context the always difficult line between mere puffing and
statements that are "warranties, and therefore, a part of the bar-
gain." 4°2 The cases are, unfortunately, absolutely correct in stating
that these issues are almost always questions of fact and are inti-
mately related to the extent to which the buyer relied on the
representations. 403 Those cases are also accurate (and very modest)
in saying that the older cases "are not always similarly treated
under warranty law." 4 4
Significantly, Frederickson v. Hackney4 5 and Appleby v.
Hendrix illustrate that there is a thin line separating the causes
of action stated in horse transactions involving breeding stock.
Indeed, it is arguable that these cases should be cited as implied
warranty or warranty of description cases. In the older Minnesota
case of Frederickson, a bull was sold because of his bloodlines,
and in the Texas case, Appleby, a stallion was sold because of his
bloodlines. There was no apparent evidence suggesting that either
3" Id.
11 See Cohan, supra note 3, at 687-93.
40 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
-1 534 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
Id. at 36.
4" See infra notes 514-61 and accompanying text; see also R. ANDERSON, supra note
15, at §§ 2-313:120-:130.
Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 765 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
401 198 N.W. 806 (Minn. 1924).
-0 673 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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seller knew the young animal was sterile; but the sales pitches in
both cases made it clear that the seller knew the purchaser wanted
the animal solely for breeding purposes.
In Frederickson, the court brushed aside any notion of an
express warranty, whereas in Appleby, the court found an express
warranty of fertility. The Frederickson case expressed considerable
wisdom on the subject. 407 Showing how this body of law blends
into implied warranty law, and fraud law, the Minnesota court in
Frederickson cites an older case that notes that the law "does not
impute to the seller knowledge as to qualities or fitness which no
human foresight or skill can attain." 48 The court continues by
stating that:
[w]hile that statement may not sufficiently emphasize the seller's
knowledge that the article will be valueless to the purchaser unless
fit for a particular purpose, it shows the utter impossibility, in
reason, of creating an implied warranty in a case of this kind,
where neither party can know anything about what the future
will prove concerning the particular qualifications expected and
desired in the subject-matter of the sale.409
The only apparent factual difference between the cases is that
in the Texas case the stallion was expected to go directly into
breeding, whereas in the older Minnesota case the bull was appar-
ently a year or so too young to be a breeding animal. Without
attempting to resolve that difficulty, it arguably should not be
analyzed as a pure express warranty of fact.410 As the Judge in
Cohen noted, as long as a horse is alive, it is a horse 41' In fact,
perhaps a dead horse is literally a horse. A horse ordinarily breathes;
and a stallion ordinarily breeds-just as a car ordinarily drives
passengers down the street. However, such facts are usually given
4 There can be no more appropriate occasion for the adoption of the rule of
'caveat emptor' than the sale of an immature animal, the principal value of
which depends upon its later becoming a breeder. Sterility is the exception.
Still there are many contingencies attending the adolescence even of brutes
that would make it an anomalous thing to impose upon a vendor, who parts
with the possession and responsibility for the rearing of the animal, the liability
of having the sale rescinded in -the event that, at maturity, the animal proves
to be sterile.
Frederickson v. Hackney, 198 N.W. 806, 806 (Minn. 1924).
Id. at 807 (quoting McQuaid v. Ross, 55 N.W. 705, 706 (Wisc. 1893)).
409 Id.
410 A warranty of description is of course one sort of express warranty. U.C.C. § 2-
313(b).
411 Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1265, 1270 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
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legal effect by virtue of implied warranties (even if the car is not
designated as such). 412 If it is established that both parties had full
knowledge and intent that the horse was headed to the breeding
shed, does the word "stallion" in the contract really add anything?
Probably so; but if it does, then there is a warranty of description.
To the contrary, some warranties often described as warranties
of description (as in the leading case of Keck v. Wacker)4 3 should
be viewed as pure express warranties. A statement that a mare did
not conceive (as opposed to having conceived a fetus and aborted)
is a statement of fact, pure and simple. Or rather, pure-and not
so simple. If characterizing a horse as sound means there are no
broken bones, then describing a horse as barren should mean (to
horsemen in that business) there was no aborted foal. Similarly, if
there is "a custom in the horse auction business ... that when a
mare is sold under the representation that she has been bred, such
representation conveys a reasonable assumption that the mare is
pregnant or in foal," then custom has been used to describe that
existing fact. 41
4
However subtle and complex, these statements are still state-
ments of fact, and the implication is of a fact-not of a new
warranty of quality. The horse has not been described; a fact about
it has been stated. The mare either had been bred or it had not;
and it is the same mare described in the catalog, the pregnancy
condition being no different than a statement about the condition
of bones or wind.
This point becomes important when considering cases such as
Travis v. Washington Horse Breeders Association.45 The interme-
diate appellate court confused express and implied warranties, strik-
ing all disclaimers of warranty. The final appellate court in
Washington held, to the contrary, that express warranties are to
be "construed" to be consistent with disclaimers and vice versa-
and that is all.41 6 The point here is that a pure express warranty is
to be treated as nothing more or less than that-neither an excuse
to analyze an implied warranty, nor as a description that is subject
to conformity analysis under the U.C.C.
4I Apparently this transition is not much litigated as to used cars either. Burnham,
Remedies Available to the Purchaser of a Defective Used Car, 47 MONT. L. REv. 273, 284
(1986).
4,1 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
4 McKnight v. Bellamy, 449 S.W.2d 706, 706 (Ark. 1970).
4,1 734 P.2d 956 (Wash. App. 1987), rev'd in part, 759 P.2d 418 (Wash. 1988).
416 759 P.2d 418, 422 (Wash. 1988).
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C. Implied Warranties
As with respect to express warranties, a full analysis of the law
of implied warranties begins with an article published heretofore
by the Journal.4 7 The distinctions and applications of the two
implied warranties of the U.C.C.-those of merchantability, and
that of fitness for a particular purpose-are there described. Sim-
ilarly, the merchant or non-merchant status of the parties, distinc-
tions between ordinary and particular purposes, and other technical
requirements of the doctrines are there discussed.
Matters of reliance and knowledge in this cause of action are
discussed along with similar matters and other causes of action
later in this Article.4 18 For now, this section serves as a transition
between express warranties and warranties of description. The im-
plied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose, taken together, stand for the proposition that, in ordinary
circumstances, a seller of goods should provide some assurance to
the buyer that the goods will actually function. Implied warranties
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose are gap
fillers under the U.C.C. On the face of it, they seem eminently
fair: if a car is sold, it ought to have an engine that fires up when
the key is turned. If a pesticide is sold, it should kill some insects.
The only other point to be made is that implied warranties of
quality (as opposed to title) are a radical departure from tradition
in horse cases, where caveat emptor was the familiar rule.41 9 Ken-
tucky still carves some defects of horses out of the U.C.C.'s implied
warranties. 420 Why is it that implied warranties were not usual with
horses? The inherent fragility of the equine animal, and the inher-
ent unknowability of its future, makes anyone in the horse business
(and any non-merchant user of a horse for any purpose) keenly
aware of the riskiness of the venture. 42 A bowed tendon, for
417 Cohan, supra note 3, at 672.
41" See infra notes 514-81 and accompanying text.
411 See Egan v. Call, 34 Pa. 236, 238 (1859) ("Certainly, there is no such engagement
in the sale of such an article as a horse."); Wood v. Ross, 26 S.W. 148, 149 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1894) ("In a general sale of a horse the seller only warrants it to be an animal of the
description it appears to be, and nothing more."); see also Merchants' & Mechanics' Say.
Bank v. Fraze, 36 N.E. 378, 380 (Ind. 1894) ("If a man sells a horse generally, he warrants
no more than that it is a horse."); Moore v. Miller, 100 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. 1936); Annotation,
Implied Warranty of Fitness on Sale of Livestock, 55 A.L.R. 2d 892 (1957). But see Tarulli
v. Birds in Paradise, 417 N.Y.S.2d 854, 898 (1979).
4- K.R.S. § 355.2-316(3)(d).
421 See Miller, supra note 17, at 738.
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example, can appear almost instantaneously after the sale. 422 This
inherent riskiness must be part of any analysis of implied warran-
ties, even if the U.C.C. requires that that analysis start with the
implied grant of such an assurance. Can any disclaimer of mere
implied warranties be unconscionable? Perhaps it can if certain
facts are present, such as the knowledge of the seller and the
latency of the defect facing a buyer. Surely the final court in Travis
had some such point in mind.
D. Warranty of Description
Several classic horse cases involve expansive readings of de-
scriptions of breeding animals423 where statements of fact about a
mare's breeding history are understood by people in the business
to show important tendencies in the mare's ability to conceive and
carry a foal to term. These cases are best analyzed as regarding
express warranties of fact. 424 It would be more accurate to label a
statement that the horse is a mare as a warranty of description
and claim a breach of that warranty if she has no reasonable
prospect to conceive and bear a foal. However, in most breeds, it
is understood that a mare could well be a racehorse or a showhorse,
fully in accordance with her description, even if she is entirely
sterile. That would be a matter of proof of common linguistic
usage.
This sort of analysis applies more comfortably to male horses.
As suggested earlier, 421 a stallion is a breeding animal. It stretches
the description a bit, but it is at least arguable that when one
describes a colt one is indicating "his sex to be that of a stallion. "426
Certainly a castrated male is not a stallion.427 It is also held that
an animal "with one undescended testicle" is not merchantable as
a breeding animal.
428
This progression of cases takes us, step by step, back to the
proposition that even in a body of law where implied warranties
4" Strauss v. West, 216 A.2d 366 (R.I. 1966).
4" See Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton,
703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
424 See supra notes 347-69 and accompanying text.
425 See supra notes 399-416 and accompanying text.
2 Grandi v. LeSage, 399 P.2d 285, 288-89 (N.M. 1965).
47 Brodsky v. Nerud, 414 N.Y.S.2d 38 (N.Y. 1979). Incidentally, for purposes of
obtaining a gentle saddle horse, a description as a gelding is much better, and is a cause of
breach if not true. O'Shea v. Hatch, 640 P.2d 515 (N.M. App. 1982).
42 Dempsey v. Rosenthal, 468 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983) (a dog case
citing horse law).
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are not traditional, the description of an animal as a breeding
animal can be construed to promise the ability to perform the
breeding function. Alpert v. Thomas429 holds that a warranty of
merchantability of a stallion guarantees a high level of fertility.
That case goes too far; but it is not unusual in non-animal cases
for merchantability and fitness warranties to be imported into
description warranties. 430 Other cases attempt to distinguish be-
tween the two.4 1 Professor Anderson notes the "undesirable con-
fusion" of warranties of description with implied warranties, noting
that the warranty of description is by definition an "express"
warranty. 4 2 An appropriate resolution of the problem is to realize
that merchantability and fitness analysis and understanding can be
brought to bear on matters of construction of express warranties.
It is worth noting finally that the plaintiff in Cohen attempted
to stretch the description of the horse as a yearling to mean that
it was a racehorse 433 -which, of course, it is not. In a different
case, however, this form of analysis will be useful.
E. Acceptance/Failure of Consideration
In this paragraph, this Article addresses two rights of rescission,
one covered concretely by two sections of the U.C.C., and another
growing out of many contradictory common law cases. The U.C.C.
rights allow a purchaser to "reject" a horse (a) if "the tender of
delivery fail[s] in any respect to conform to the contract, ' 434 and
(b) if at a later time a later-discovered "non-conformity substan-
tially impairs [the horse's] value to him." 435 The Code's several
requirements of inspection are later discussed, as they relate to and
reflect reliance;436 and the U.C.C.'s general requirements on the
buyer to discover a non-conformity promptly was analyzed above,
when this Article discussed the role of custom. 437 In this paragraph,
the difference between two U.C.C. recission rights is significant:
(a) an early failure "in any respect" (for the right to "reject") as
429 643 F. Supp. 1406 (D.Vt. 1986).
43o See Agricultural Serv. Ass'n, Inc. v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.
1977); Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Folds, 212 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1975).
431 Kennedy v. Cornhusker Hybrid Co., 19 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 1945).
432 R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-313:76.
433 Cohen, 712 F. Supp. 1265.
434 R. ANDERsON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-601, -602.
431 Id. at -608.
436 See infra notes 514-61 and accompanying text.
437 See supra notes 202-19 and accompanying text.
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opposed to (b) a later failure that "substantially impairs" the
horse's value (for a right to "revoke acceptance" .)438
The former rule (involving early discovery) has sometimes been
called the rule of perfect tender.439 The latter (involving later dis-
covery) variously focuses on the relative size of the damage "by
objective evidence rather than the buyer's personal position" or
proof of "a special devaluing effect on him."" 0 More accurately,
the latter issue is determined by whether there is an objective
detriment, based on the personalized purpose of the purchaser:
It would appear that the sound view is that a personalized objec-
tive determination is to be made, personalized in the sense that
the circumstances must be viewed from the viewpoint and the
circumstances of the buyer, objective in the sense that even though
personalized, the criterion is what a reasonable person would
have believed if in the same position as the buyer.44'
The common law notion of failure of consideration provides
an analog to these Code issues 442 Rescission at common law is
available if the property purchased is "wholly unsuitable for the
use or purpose to which it is known by the seller that the buyer
intends to" apply the property.443 Apart from the issue of what
"is known by the seller,"" the notion of "wholly unsuitable" is
(as one might expect) not always rigidly applied. In view of the
history of horse law, with its emphasis on caveat emptor, a rigid
rule might be considered the usual one. For example, Pidcock v.
J. Crouch & Son445 holds that the proof of damages does not have
to "establish the damage with arithmetical accuracy; but there must
be such proof as to furnish a reasonable basis for the action of
the jury when it comes to the question of abating the purchase.
'" 446
43 See U.C.C. §§ 2-601, -602, -608.
411 Capitol Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 535, 539
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983); R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-601:5.
Colonial Dodge, Inc. v. Miller, 362 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Mich. 1984) (failure to
include a spare tire constituted a substantial impairment in value of automobile entitling
buyer to revoke acceptance).
R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-608:23.
,, This relationship is noted in Freeman Oldsmobile Mazda Co. v. Pinson, 580 S.W.2d
112, 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
"3 Id.
" See infra notes 562-81 and accompanying text.
"1 66 S.E. 971 (Ga. 1910).
" Id. at 972. Cf. Egan, 34 Pa. at 655 ("Mere inadequacy of consideration, without
warranty or fraud, is no defense.").
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Other cases rely on substantial or material failures. Thus, "[a]
substantial failure of consideration ordinarily justifies rescission" 447
or "[p]roof of a material failure of consideration may excuse a
party from performing its duties under a contract." 4" The common
law cause of action is to be distinguished from the notion that
there is no "valid consideration," that is, no consideration at all.449
This distinction would better be made by calling this latter defense
failure of performance rather than failure of consideration, but it
is not done so traditionally at law. The terminology is made more
clear in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 40
The U.C.C. and common law defenses/claims are treated to-
gether because the fact patterns or transactions of each are so
similar. It has been suggested that the U.C.C. provisions have
displaced the common law defense/claim, 451 but it is equally ar-
guable that non-Code defenses/claims survived the adoption of the
Code.
45 2
These defenses/claims are related to, but distinct from claims
of breach of warranty. Particularly where the goods have been
accepted, "the right to revoke acceptance ... does not arise from
every breach of warranty. ' 45 3 This is notably true in horse cases.
Specifically, the buyer's burden of proof is far higher in a "non-
conformity" case than in a warranty damage case. 454 The case of
White Devon Farm v. Stahl455 makes a jumble of the Code provi-
sions, but makes the central point of noting that "substantial"
must take into account the peculiar facts applicable to most horses:
"A horse has at least two separate and disparate values-his value
for racing, and his value for breeding. ' 456
I O.P. Link Handle Co. v. Wright, 429 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Ky. 1968) (emphasis added).
4, Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882, 887 (Colo. 1981) (emphasis added).
' See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 377 S.W.2d 93 (Ky. 1964).
410 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 comment a (1981) ("What is sometimes
referred to as 'failure of consideration' by courts and statutes (e.g., Uniform Commercial
Code § 3-408) is referred to in this Restatement as 'failure of performance' to avoid
confusion with the absence of consideration").
"I Freeman Oldsmobile, 580 S.W.2d 112.
452 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977); see also R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-608:21
("[Firaud or some similar non-Code ground.") and § 2-711:46. Cohen, 712 F. Supp. 1265,
treats the common law defense as remaining.
41 Colum v. Fred Tuch Buick, 285 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
" Coyle Chevrolet Co. v. Carrier, 397 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
411 389 N.Y.S.2d 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
11 Id. at 728.
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Two cases from the same Kentucky federal trial court, Keck v.
Wacker57 and Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc.,451 put these
matters into perspective. In Keck, a mare was found not to fit its
description in an auction catalogue. 459 It had aborted its most recent
fetus rather than having failed to get in foal in that breeding
season. 0
The court correctly noted the effect under the U.C.C.:
When the sale and auction was made at Keeneland, title to the
mare passed to Mrs. Wacker, and through her agents, Wacker
and Hirsch, she accepted the mare under KRS 355.2-606... Then
pursuant to KRS 355.2-608(3), the buyer, Mrs. Wacker, who
revoked, had the same right and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if she had rejected them.4 1
But the court then made a mistake in its analysis. It held that
when "the burden [is] placed on the buyer to establish any breach
with respect to the goods accepted, K.R.S. § 355.2-607(4) does not
apply. '462 This reasoning was entirely circular. If the buyer has
already met her burden to show a substantially impairing non-
conformity, why is there any need thereafter to show anything
about conformity at all? The Keck court cites Miron v. Yonkers
Raceway, Inc.463 for this proposition. Miron states that a late
revocation places the burden on the buyer to prove non-conform-
ity.4 4 It does not state the converse. Although it is not relevant in
the Keck case, Keck's circular reasoning is treated as being dispo-
sitive in Alpert,465 where the seller had possession of the horse for
many months before any inspections were made.46
On the other hand, Keck does dramatize the difference between
a mere warranty case and a non-conformity case. 467 Because the
45 413 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
4 712 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
" Keck, 413 F. Supp. at 1380.
4W Id.
46 Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1382-83.
40 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968).
4" Id. at 120.
4 643 F. Supp. at 1419.
4" Burdens of proof are entitled to a law journal article of their own. See, for example,
the confusion in R. ANDERsON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-313:25, 2-315:64. Burdens are
particularly important in horse cases, which must often be submitted very quickly for
summary judgment because of the importance of every day and month in the life of a
horse. See, e.g., Norton v. Lindsay, 350 F.2d 46 (10th Cir. 1965).
46, Keck, 413 F. Supp. at 1382-83.
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Keck opinion involved the warranty of a fact in the mare's breeding
record, its importance to equine law tends to obscure its application
in the more usual case of warranties of quality. No inspection by
the buyer prior to the sale in Keck would have made a difference.
468
The court made no distinction in Keck between a rejection and a
revocation of acceptance. The Keck opinion further obscures this
difference by relying on Miron-which might as well have been in
an entirely different body of law.469 Keck is in fact in the line of
Schleicher v. Gentry,470 which purports to apply a "warranty of
identification," 471 a common law parallel to the U.C.C.'s treatment
of non-conformity with description. 472
Similarly, the court in Cohen treated a claim of failure of
consideration as if it were the same as a warranty. 473 In that case,
the seller had noted the ancient authority that warranties are not
expansively read in the horse business. 474 The Court in Cohen
continued:
In plaintiff's response thereto, he argues that there was a failure
of consideration because the horse cannot fulfill the sole purpose
for which it was purchased. Obviously, plaintiff is arguing war-
ranty, and since all warranties were disclaimed, his argument is
without merit. The only way there could be a failure of consid-
eration would be if plaintiff had received (1) nothing, (2) a dead
yearling, or (3) a live yearling different from the one on which
he bid. None of these contingencies are present herein.
475
4w Id. at 1381.
41 See supra notes 463-64 and accompanying text.
' ' 554 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
471 Id. at 885.
-" U.C.C. § 2-608 (1988). Like Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1968), in the area of warranties of quality, Schliecher applies the context and practices of
the horse industry to determine reasonableness in the timing of discovery and recission. 554
S.W.2d at 885-86.
413 712 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
14 Id. at 1269. Merchants' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, 36 N.E. at 380 ("If a man
says a horse generally, he warrants no more than it is a horse."); Wood v. Ross, 26 S.W.
148, 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) ("[I]n a general sale of a horse the seller only warrants it
to be an animal of the description it appears to be, and nothing more.").
415 Cohen, 712 F. Supp. at 1270. Here is the point at which the Court began to stray:
it was not true to say that all warranties were disclaimed. Warranties of description are
sometimes found in apparently innocent description language, and such express warranties
were not disclaimed. Furthermore, conformity with the contract goes beyond matters of
warranty. If there is a perfect tender rule that requires the delivery of a perfect yearling,
and if (as in Cohen) there is a rejection (as opposed to a revocation of acceptance), then
one need not meet all the tests required for relief from a breach of warranty. Compare
U.C.C. § 2-602 (1988) (rejection) with U.C.C. § 2-608 (revocation of acceptance). After all,
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In so holding, the court was supported by ample authority, viz.,
by the general rule that "if a seller properly disclaims all warranties
the item cannot be non-conforming and revocation is not in or-
der." 47
6
What, however, if the conditions of sale of the auction in
Cohen had not only specifically disclaimed unexpressed warranties,
but had also provided that no non-warranted condition would be
considered a substantial non-conformity with the contract?47 7-thus
referring to the revocation of acceptance rules but not the rejection
rules. There would then be a interesting question: since the buyer
had not inspected the horse, nor had he refused a demand for
inspection (thus not having accepted the horse), was he then entitled
to perfect tender under U.C.C. section 2-201? Would the condi-
tions' explicit distinction between unexpressed warranties (which
were disclaimed) and conformity with the contract (which was
disclaimed only as to substantial matters) require a different result?
Of course, in Keck and Cohen that issue is purely theoretical.
In Keck there was a warranty and a non-conformity shown. In
Cohen there was neither a warranty nor a non-conformity alleged.
Had there been a genuine claim of non-conformity-if the colt had
a reproductive defect, which made it something less than a colt
but not quite a ridgeling or gelding478-would the buyer have been
entitled to a perfectly tendered colt?
F. Fraud
As noted previously, 479 common law fraud (at least in some
forms) constitutes an exception to the parol evidence rule and to
the statute of frauds; it is a special case with respect to disclaim-
ers. 410 In fact, common law fraud is specifically retained by the
terms of the Code.411 In some cases, in the horse business and
the standard remedy for a breach of warranty is damages, even if damages are not ordinarily
sought in horse cases. See generally U.C.C. § 2-313. The ordinary disclaimer does not
disclaim warranties of description and conformity goes beyond the law of warranty. It is
possible to write a contract or a condition that solves these problems: "buyer agrees he has
no remedies even if the horse turns out to be a dog, and even if the dog is dead."
416 D. LIEBSON & R. NowKA, Tim UNroR COMMERCIAL CODE OF KENTUCKY 146
(1983) (citing Clark v. Ford Motor, 612 P.2d 316 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)).
4" Keeneland's conditions of sale included such language at one time.
478 See supra notes 399-433 and accompanying text.
,19 See supra notes 141-202 and accompanying text.
40 See supra notes 78-119 and accompanying text.
-1 U.C.C. § 1-103.
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elsewhere, the results are simple: if the seller tells an absolute,
knowing, material lie about the condition of his or her animal, the
buyer reasonably relied on the representation, 48 2 and the buyer is
thereby substantially injured, a cause of action arises.48 3
Transactions involving active concealment where an action (other
than speaking a word) would "prevent another from learning a
fact" are the equivalent of false statements. 48 4 So, too, are the
related cases where the seller is merely silent, but would have to
speak to correct some previous assertion.415
The more typical situation in the horse business, however, is
where there is a defect known to the seller and not discoverable
by an ordinary inspection of the buyer. This is a truly latent defect.
As would seem likely in so perplexing a situation, animal cases
hold both that silence in such a situation is actionable4 6 and not
actionable. 4 7 It is the author's opinion that whatever the rule in a
pure case of that sort, a cause of action ought to arise at least
where there is some substantial additional (silence-'"plus") factor
in the surrounding circumstances. One such factor might be the
fact that the undisclosed latent defect amounts to total worthless-
ness-which additional fact is sometimes held to convert this fact
pattern into fraud. 488 Such a cause of action might equally well be
482 It is clear that "mere silence" in a circumstance "where means of information are
as accessible to one party as the other" will not constitute fraud. Bryant v. Troutman, 287
S.W.2d 918, 920 (Ky. 1956).
411 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-548a. Cases containing all the elements
are too numerous to cite. See, e.g., Chernick, 703 S.W.2d 885.
I8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 550-551 (1977).
185 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(a) (1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 528, 550-551 (1977).
4,5 Cantrell v. Owen, 13 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Neb. 1944) ("In this connection it holds
only that the seller of cattle for breeding purposes who knows that they are infected with
a disease which is not discoverable by inspection and keeps silent is guilty of fraud and
that under such circumstances the rule of caveat emptor does not apply.").
41 Court v. Snyder, 28 N.E. 718, 719 (Ind. App. 1891) ("The mere fact that the seller
is aware of a latent defect in the animal will not amount to fraud").
411 Thompson v. Miser, 92 N.E. 420 (Ohio 1910):
Where the evidence tended to show that a cow had been sold and purchased
for a breeder, and to improve the plaintiff's herd of cattle, that there was a
latent defect which would greatly impair, if not destroy, her capacity to breed,
that this was known to the vendors, and unknown to the vendees, and was
not disclosed at the time of sale, and a charge was asked that, if these facts
were found by the jury, then, and in that case, the defendants would be guilty
of practicing fraud.
Id. at 422; see also Burnett v. Hensley, 92 N.W. 678 (Iowa 1902). The spectrum of
possibilities as to "totality" is discussed in the Kentucky real estate case of Kaye v.
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called a total failure of consideration case, i.e., one bordering on
fraud.4 9 Courts could choose where along the spectrum from total
to substantial to material they wish to draw this line.
490
The view of the contracts and torts Restatements is quite sim-
ilar. Apart from the obvious cases, and one additional situation
where a party in its silence fails to "correct a mistake of the other
party as to the contents or effect" of the agreement, 491 the Re-
statements create two residual categories that bear analysis.
492
The Restatements treat a non-disclosure as the equivalent of a
lie, where there is "a relation of trust and confidence ' 493 or "a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence. '494 A
typical duty of a fiduciary is well-recognized as a silence-"plus"
factor.495 Silence here, however, could very well be analyzed as
breach of a fiduciary's duty of disclosure, a subset of the duty of
loyalty.496 The case need not be analyzed then as a fraud at all,
just as the total worthlessness case can be moved out of the fraud
context. Other confidential relations in the context of the horse
business might be those between parent and child, and among
siblings, but these are not likely to arise very often unless the
general public duties of industry institutions are included in this
category. It certainly will not do simply to plead in some general
way that there is a duty, and expect to get past even a motion to
dismiss .49
7
In Cohen, the court noted that the plaintiff had suggested that
there was some duty both to "discover and disclose any defects. ' 498
The court held that neither duty existed. 499 The seller and the buyer
Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1955), where even a "potential" serious problem is held
actionable. Id. at 208.
,,1 See supra notes 392-488 and accompanying text; see infra notes 490-605 and accom-
panying text.
49 Hughes v. Robertson, 17 Ky. (1 T.B. Mon.) 215 (1824) is a good example of such
a choice-which would not be made the same way today.
411 RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
492 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1977).
49' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 161(d).
4"4 REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) TORTS § 551(2)(a).
4"' Anderson v. Tway, 143 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944) (duty of bank director as fiduciary),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 861 (1945).
49 See supra notes 287-346 and accompanying text.
411 Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) ("In sum, the
appellants have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, for the complaint,
although it alleges a breach of fiduciary duty, fails to state facts from which a fiduciary
relationship arises.").
4 712 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
49 Id.
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had never even met, and their agents had barely exchanged greet-
ings.50 Any duty to discover would be the subject of the rules
relating to the seller's special knowledge °50 and a duty to disclose
under Cohen must rest on some "plus" in the transaction.5 2
The second residual category of the Restatements is variously
formulated. Section 161(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts requires disclosure if the statement would "correct a mistake
of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is
making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to
a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing. ' 503 Note in particular the word "and."
The necessity of a mistake relates to the earlier discussion of mutual
mistake, 504 allowing for the possibility that a standard warranty
disclaimer would ordinarily absolve a seller. 505
Section 551(2)(e) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts phrases
the equivalent category as involving only those circumstances where
the other party is acting under a mistake as to the undisclosed
facts, and that this person, "because of the relationship between
them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances,
would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts. ' ' 506 Once more
the formulation requires a mistake, and once more there may be
no actionable mistake if a proper disclaimer is included. As in the
contract Restatement, the tort claim leaves open a window to fit
varying circumstances.
There is one unmistakable thread running through many of the
cases cited, whether they are fraud cases or not-courts apply a
"smell test" to the transaction. Insofar as this can be reduced to
a principle of law, it is probably that courts recognize in some
transactions what are known as "badges of fraud. 50 7 These badges
at least have the important effect of shifting burdens of proof.508
In a non-auction context, probably the most frequent badge of
"I Id. at 1266-67.
'0" See infra notes 562-81 and accompanying text.
'02 712 F. Supp. at 1266-67.
'o1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161b (1981) (emphasis added).
0 See supra notes 392-97 and accompanying text.
-10 See supra notes 434-78 and accompanying text.
506 RESTATEMENT (SECoND) o TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977).
See, e.g., Hayes v. Rodgers, 447 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1969).
MO A badge of fraud may act to prevent a directed verdict, Russell County Feed Mill,
Inc. v. Kimbler, 520 S.W.2d 309 (Ky. 1975), or a summary judgment, Hayes v. Rodgers,
447 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1969); Trent v. Carroll, 380 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1964).
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fraud is the general tenor of secrecy surrounding the transaction.1 9
Similarly, peculiar alterations in the deal after it is made are
"badges of fraud".5 10 This is a particular expression of the general
notion that "[a]ny transaction conducted in a manner differing
from customary methods may be fraudulent."511
It is likely that as horse law develops, more will be known
about the scope of the factors required to brand as fraudulent the
non-disclosure of a latent defect. This author believes that all the
conscionability issues of general law will play an important role.
512
It is also believed that conscionability can remove the Restatements'
mistake limitations. 51 3
G. Reliance and Inspection
It is a principal thesis of this Article that the horse transaction
almost always involves in one form or another the buyer's degree
of reliance on statements made or implied by the seller, and the
related issue of whether the buyer inspected (or might have in-
spected) the horse prior to the sale. The threads of reliance and
inspection run through all the causes of action with respect to the
quality of the horse.51 4 This discussion is organized in accordance
with the various causes of action, but recognizing that they all
relate to each other.
1. Express Warranty Cases
The Fifth Circuit in Calloway v. Manion5" notes that Texas
courts cannot decide whether "buyer reliance is unnecessary to
" Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 241 N.E.2d 16, 20 (11. App. Ct. 1968) ("The
lack of courage to submit a matter involving mutual interest to mutual consideration is an
index to the state of mind of the grantor to which the maxim that secrecy is a badge of
fraud has peculiar application."); see also Nelson v. Nelson, 512 S.W.2d 455 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1974).
110 See United States v. Leggett, 292 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
914 (1961); Bolling v. Adams, 296 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1956); Campbell v. First National Bank
of Barbourville, 27 S.W.2d 975 (Ky. 1930); Johnson v. Cormney, 596 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1980).
5" Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); see also Credit Union of
America v. Myers, 676 P.2d 99 (Kan. 1984); Montana Nat'l Bank v. Michaels, 631 P.2d
1260 (Mont. 1981).
512 See supra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
1,3 See infra notes 584-90 and accompanying text.
s See, e.g., Calloway v. Manion, 572 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1988); Sessa, 427 F. Supp.
760 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
515 572 F.2d 1033 (1978).
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support an express warranty cause of action"; this type of confu-
sion is especially prevalent in the horse cases.5 16 There can be no
doubt but that the U.C.C. drafters intended to remove reliance as
part of the express warranty cause of action, 517 but the issue creeps
back in under the U.C.C.'s requirement that a warranty be a "part
of the bargain," which is merely a "less stringent" reliance
requirement518-but the meaning of this is unclear. 19 McClure v.
Duggan5 20 formulates the test as a contextual question, turning on
"whether negotiations had progressed to such a point that the
statement could be considered a condition precedent to the
sale..."52
The same ambivalence is to be found in the traditional horse
cases. Whether a statement is an actionable warranty has always
been based on "the circumstances surrounding the sale, the rea-
sonableness of the buyer in believing the seller, and the reliance
placed on the seller's statement by the buyer. ' ' 522 In actuality,
warranty claims require less reliance when they appear to be "a
flagrant breach of an express warranty bordering on fraud," in
which case what "buyers would assume" takes the place of reliance
in fact. 23
Where the full facts of the case are taken into account, one
key element in express warranty cases is the nature of the inspection
made by or available to the buyer-an issue to which we shall
shortly return. Thus, what "could be expected ... merely from a
personal inspection of the horse" is a central issue.524 As to express
warranties, and every other cause of action, it should always be
recalled that under U.C.C. section 2-513 the buyer has "a right
... to inspect" before payment.
25
The overlap among the causes of action based on the overall
fact pattern is also seen in the leading Tenth Circuit case, Norton
51 Id. at 1037 n.6.
" R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-313:48.
3"8 Id.
519 The court in Sessa suggests that when the warranty about a horse is a "part of the
basis of the bargain" it is a separate issue; and that "this is essentially a reliance requirement
and is inextricably intertwined with the initial determination as to whether given language
may constitute an express warranty." 427 F. Supp. at 766. The court states that it was not
the intention of the drafters of the U.C.C. "to require a strong showing of reliance." Id.
674 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
2! Id. at 222.
12 Slyman v. Pickwick Farms, 472 N.E.2d 380, 384 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
52 McKnight, 449 S.W.2d at 709.
1z Slyman, 472 N.E.2 at 384.
5- U.C.C. § 2-513 (1988).
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v. Lindsay.526 In Norton, the court assumed that the horse was
entirely worthless-treating racing qualities as the sole measure of
value, despite having noted in passing that the breeding qualities
of the horse had been discussed by the parties.5 27 In Norton, too,
the seller knew of the defect.528 In such a case, one would again
expect a court to apply the most modest requirement of reliance.
Thus, the court stated:
The fact that appellee's trainer did inspect the horse but did not
detect is of no importance for the facts conclusively show the
defect was not ascertainable by a layman. Investigation is com-
patible with the giving of an express warranty. Only where the
buyer clearly relies only upon his own investigation and waives
the warranty will it be rendered inoperative.
There is danger of giving greater effect to the requirement of
reliance than it is entitled to... and as a general rule no evidence
of reliance by the buyer is necessary other than the seller's state-
ments were of a kind which naturally would induce the buyer to
purchase the goods and that he did purchase the goods.... If a
representation was evidently made for the purpose of inducing a
sale, and was of a kind appropriate for that purpose and a sale
followed, this should be enough.
529
Clearly, the existence of total worthlessness and the seller's knowl-
edge influenced the court in determining that a statement that the
horse was sound is an express warranty-going far beyond the
necessary construction of that word.5 30 Neither is supposed to mat-
ter for express warranties, but both do, of course.
In O'Connell v. Kennedy, 531 where there was no apparent
knowledge on the part of the seller, a somewhat more rigid test
was suggested. "To support an action for breach of warranty it
must appear that the affirmation or statement relied upon was
made under such circumstances as to warrant the inference that it
entered into the contract of sale as finally made. 5 32 Unaccounta-
bly, however, the court slipped away from this point, brushing
aside a thorough investigation made by the buyer's veterinarian.
350 F.2d 46 (10th Cir. 1965).
527 Id. at 47.
523 Id.
"I Id. at 49 (quoting 1 WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 206 (1973)).
Mo See Cohan, supra note 3, at 675.
M 101 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. 1951).
M Id. at 895.
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"There is no evidence that Dr. Terry found evidence of disease
and, if he should have, the right of the plaintiff to rely on the
defendant's affirmation would not be affected.
533
The court further held that it is not necessary that the buyer
have an expert examination made of the horse before purchase.1
34
The court in O'Connell stated what this author believes to be the
correct rule in the case of mere breaches of express warranty, but
misapplied the general principle because of a misunderstanding of
the importance of expert advice at horse sales. The lapse is all the
more unfortunate because the court was not faced with a total
failure of quality. It involved a case where only the seeds of the
disease were in the horse. The horse would have had a period of
time of considerable usefulness.
5 35
2. The Fraud Cases
The traditional fraud cases are much more clear, but they make
no sense when compared to the warranty rule. In Fasig-Tipton Co.
v. Jaffe,536 it was stated that a defrauded horse purchaser must
prove that he or she actually relied upon the representations made
in entering into the agreement to purchase horses. 5 7 The general
law of fraud, both under the common law reflected in the original
torts Restatement531 and the modern Restatement (Second),5 39 de-
veloped detailed rules as to the justifiable level of reliance. 540 The
more modern rule requires the buyer to show "good faith and...
reasonable standards of fair dealing, ' 541 which is a good distance
from the older rules, which punished "negligence" in having
"trusted him. ' 542 The latter rule destroyed a cause of action where
a buyer had "made personal examinations [with] opportunity to
discover the truth. ' 543 A more modern practice will certainly make
reliance no greater a burden on a defrauded buyer than on one
533 Id.
534 Id.
3' See Cohan, supra note 3, at 676. See generally Young & Cooper, Inc. v. Vestdng,
521 P.2d 281, 291 (Kan. 1974).
' 449 N.Y.S.2d 268, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
S37 Id.
131 See Johnson v. Lowery, 270 S.W.2d 943 (Ky. 1954).
139 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) Or TORTS §§ 537-545A (1977).
3" See also Forbis v. Reilly, 684 F. Supp. at 1323 (burden to show "justified" reliance).
'41 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 170-172 (1981).
34 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. City of Lexington, 76 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Ky. 1934).
3 O'Brien v. Marvin, 387 S.W.2d 282 (Ky. 1965).
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for whom a mere warranty has been breached, and certainly will
not punish a buyer for failing to make an independent investigation
in circumstances where it is not customary to do so.544 Finally,
there is a body of law developing in securities law which distin-
guishes between the reliance required in face to face transactions,
and the non-conclusive presumption of reliance in public market
purchases,- 45 which provides a useful analysis for horse cases.
3. The Implied Warranties
In the field of implied warranties, it is certainly true that the
U.C.C. drafters initially intended to create in the merchantability
warranty "a form of strict liability [where] failures to use reason-
able care [are] not relevant to a determination of liability." 541 With
respect to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose 5 47 the Code expressly requires that buyers rely on the skill of
sellers to select the horse for them, which is taken to mean (though
it does not say) that buyers actually do so rely.5 48 But the reality
intrudes on both implied warranties to focus on what the buyer
could "reasonably have anticipated. ' 549 Under U.C.C. section 2-
316, which covers both implied warranties, there is a waiver of any
defect that examination "ought in the circumstances to have re-
vealed to him" where the buyer "has examined the goods ... as
fully as he desired," or where he "has refused to examine the
goods."550 It will not go without notice that to avoid these implied
warranties, the seller of a horse need only demand that prospective
buyers make a thorough inspection, though in the context of horse
auctions this may not be easily accomplished in all circumstances.
4. The Rescission Causes of Action
The issue of buyer inspection in horse cases most frequently
arises in the context of the rescission causes of action-rejection,
', Compare Johnson, 596 S.W.2d 23 with Grant v. Wrona, 662 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983). See also Hughes v. Robertson, supra note 490, at 215 and 217 ("nobody could
keep the animal long, without discovering its blindness, although it might not be discovered
on the first view ... might take some time and nicety of observation to discover.").
1' See Basic Incorporated v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 980 (1988) and its progeny.
-" Cohan, supra note 3, at 673; see also R. AoNDEsoN, supra note 15, at § 2-314:55.
-7 U.C.C. § 2-315 (1988).
'4, R. ARNDERsON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-315:50-:54.
',9 Cohan, supra note 3, at 676.
o See R. ANDERsON, supra note 15, at §§ 2-314:161-:162, -315:60-:61.
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revocation of acceptance, and failure of consideration. Miron55 1 is
such a case, but is cited as authoritative on the subject of the need
to inspect even when implied warranties are discussed 5 52 as well it
should be. The rescission causes of action themselves are now
deeply rooted in U.C.C. sections 2-602 and 2-608. Acceptance
comes only after a "reasonable opportunity to inspect; ' 5 3 and
revocation of acceptance can be made only within a reasonable
time after "the buyer discovers or should have discovered the
ground" for the rejection.154 Miron adds to this mixture the correct
view that inspection prior to sale, which is customary in the cir-
cumstances, will foreclose both remedies. 5 5 The court noted that:
As the trial judge rightly pointed out, "The fact that the subject
matter of the sale in this case was a live animal ... bears on
what is a reasonable time to inspect and reject." Finkelstein's
own testimony showed that it is customary, when buying a race-
horse, to have a veterinarian or trainer examine the horse's legs,
and we agree that the existence of this custom is very important
in determining whether there was a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the horse. See Official Comment to U.C.C. §1-204, para.
2. We gather from the record that the reason it is customary to
examine a racehorse's legs at the time of sale is that a splint bone
is rather easily fractured (there was testimony that a fracture
could result from the horse kicking itself), and although the judge
made no specific findings as to this, we assume that is generally
what he had in mind when he pointed out that "a live animal is
more prone to rapid change in condition and to injury than is an
inanimate object." As we have said, Finkelstein did not have the
horse examined either at the place of sale or at his barn later the
day of the sale. He thus passed up a reasonable opportunity to
inspect Red Carpet. 56
The question of reasonableness will always be dependent on
the nature of the transaction. No set number of hours or months
would suffice. There are, however, sufficient horse cases relating
to various breaches of warranty to give a practitioner and the court
400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968).
,,2 See, e.g., Cohan, supra note 3, at 685.
55 U.C.C. § 2-606.
5- U.C.C. § 2-608.
" Miron, 400 F.2d at 118.
556 Id.
[VOL. 78
SALE OF HORSES
an understanding of the way this problem should be handled. The
extreme cases, of course, are easy.
557
Gilbert v. Caffee 5 1 for example, implicitly emphasizes and
Schleiche 59 holds explicitly that the time of year when the breeding
season occurs is critical. The four months of the breeding season
matter infinitely more than the eight months when breeding does
not take place. 60 Even more critical would be the standard training
months for a two-year-old of a racing breed-when the trade
ordinarily does not accept a three-year-old or older horse that has
not been trained to race. Similarly, as especially emphasized in
Miron,561 the likelihood of injury to the horse after delivery to the
purchaser will affect how the question of reasonableness should be
handled.
H. Seller's "Knowledge" (And a Reprise on Auctions)
One sort of knowledge involved across the spectrum of causes
of action flows the seller's knowledge of the buyer's reliance. This
is part of the precise question determined under U.C.C. section 2-
315562 of whether a fitness warranty is implied. Professor Anderson
suggests that sellers have a "duty to inquire" as to the buyer's
needs, and a good reason to disclaim this implied warranty, par-
ticularly at auction sales.5
6 3
The question, however, goes further than implied warranties.
Thus, in McKnight v. Bellamy564 where the breach of the express
warranty "bordered on fraud", the seller had "full knowledge and
intent that buyers would assume" a certain state of facts with
respect to his statements about the horse. 565 Again, in Norton566
the seller's statement was "made for the purpose of inducing a
sale. ' 567 The Norton court, quoting from Professor Williston, tac-
"5 See, e.g., Chernick v. Casares, 759 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (five years is
too long to determine fertility).
:58 293 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1980).
59 554 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
mo Id. at 885.
400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968).
56 U.C.C. § 2-315.
5" R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-315:48. As to the rule on this matter in fraud
cases, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 531-36 (1977).
5 449 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Ark. 1970).
5 Id.
350 F.2d 46, 49 (10th Cir. 1965).
567 Id.
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itly admitted that the seller's knowledge is not essential to an
express warranty claim, but suggested that a central issue was the
fact that the warranty was "of a kind which naturally would induce
the buyer to purchase the goods.
5 68
Perhaps the U.C.C. has made the seller's attitude directly rel-
evant by requiring express warranties to be a "part of the basis of
the bargain" .569 A bargain, after all, is bilateral.570 Logically, the
U.C.C. has made reliance a more difficult requirement. The matter
is resolved, however, by the use of the Norton standard (i.e., what
is "natural[?]") as the central semi-objective test both as to reliance
and knowledge of reliance.
71
The same test is appropriate (and not so far from Miron) to
trigger a requirement of a prior inspection by the buyer (i.e., would
it be natural for a buyer to take a look?), and, conversely, to
establish the seller's entitlement to expect the buyer to make an
inspection (i.e., would it be natural to suppose that a buyer had
looked?). It is helpful that the same test can apply to both situa-
tions. For each person, there is a sort of golden rule to be applied:
sellers put themselves in the shoes of the buyers-and vice versa.
That analysis, however, does not solve all the problems. It does
not help with questions relating to the purpose for which the buyer
has bid on or contracted to purchase the horse. What is natural
for most people does not help a seller know about the special needs
of his or her buyer. This question is almost always relevant (except
for merchantability warranties) 5 72 and particularly so in the cause
of action of fitness for a particular purpose.5 73
In the breeds of horses that sell for the highest prices, a modest-
priced colt is unlikely to have residual breeding value, while a high-
priced filly may be principally a breeding prospect. Will the rules
be developed with cheap colts or expensive fillies in mind?-or will
the rules vary from horse to horse and buyer to buyer? Sellers
cannot put themselves in the place of unknown buyers. The prob-
lem is exacerbated by the confused nature of the buying public at
auction sales. In such instances, one commentator correctly states
that the judgment will often have to be made on the basis of "the
568 Id.
5- U.C.C. § 2-313.
570 Id. at comment 1.
171 Norton, 350 F.2d at 46.
5n U.C.C. § 2-314.
-3 U.C.C. § 2-315.
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court's attitude and ... public policy. ' 574 The court is required
first to determine as a matter of factual context and policy what
buyers are to be considered the natural parties, and then the Norton
golden rule can be applied.
Another problem with the general area of the seller's knowledge
may be solved by the Norton formulation. It involves latent defects
about which the seller may have had some knowledge. For example,
in Rand v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,5 75 Woody Stephens noticed a
slight catch in a thoroughbred colt's hind quarters, then diagnosed
as a common fracture, which promptly healed to the extent that it
was no longer observed.5 76 Rand is not a horse sale case-but there
are many cases when a modest problem is discovered, and honor-
ably ignored on the basis that it is gone and may never return,
only to be rediscovered as a serious problem at some later date by
a different owner.
There are many cases in the general body of fraud law where
something less than full knowledge is treated as if it were knowl-
edge, as in the case of gross negligence, culpable ignorance, and
the like. 77 In such circumstances, the test to be developed is really
not so different. What varies among cases is the differential "op-
portunity to know. ' 578 In each such case, one should ask the
question from the perspective of a buyer: if the buyer had all the
information available to the seller, is it material to expect the buyer
to act? If so, then the seller knows something as well as if he or
she knows it for a certainty.
That is not to say that the problem of determining when a
seller must speak at the risk of being charged with fraud has been
resolved. As noted 5 79 that determination is to be made on the basis
of additional factors. On the contrary, it seems that there can exist
a common test-whether a normal person in the circumstances
would react to the knowledge of the ultimate truth-that can be
applied (together with evidence on whether the buyer actually relied
-17 Cohan, supra note 3, at 670.
"I Rand v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 295 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 988 (1962).
576 Id.
17 Calloway, 572 F.2d 1033; Anderson, 143 F.2d 95; Walker v. Glenn, 400 S.W.2d
223 (Ky. 1966); Kackler v. Webber, 220 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Ky. 1949); Graham v. John R.
Watts & Son, 36 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Ky. 1931); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 21 S.W.2d 474
(Ky. 1929).
17, 312 Meyers v. Monroe, 226 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Ky. 1950).
1' See supra notes 479-513 and accompanying text.
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and the seller actually knew) to determine one piece of the puzzle
in several causes of action.
Such considerations, however, are resolved in litigation. A dif-
ferent problem faces any seller at auction, where many buyers
come to inspect the horses before the sale, each wanting to perform
X-rays on a skittish young animal in an enclosed space, and/or to
poke an implement down its throat.580 It is easy for the buyers
because they need only be sure to request the normal inspections
at the particular venue and be sure not to refuse any offer to
inspect. Dare the seller refuse when asked? Sellers' refusals of
requests for inspection will foreclose their eventual argument that
the buyers should have protected themselves, or should have relied
on their own devices. The seller is open to a charge of actual
concealment if he or she had even a hint of a problem that such
an examination might have disclosed. 581
On the other hand, if one or more prospective purchasers
decides not to buy the horse apparently (or possibly) because of
something seen or suspected in an X-ray or endoscopic examina-
tion, the seller now has something more than mere golden rule
notice of a defect. The lawyer's problem is that any advice given
on the subject is only right or wrong after the examination is
complete and the horse is sold. The "correct" answer for the seller
is to allow inspections only if he or she has a healthy horse. Clients
will not be pleased with such advice. The reader will have to be
satisfied with knowing that auction venues change the problems-
and perhaps the proper rules.
L Unilateral Mistake (And a Reprise on Reliance, Knowledge and
Conscionability)
The general notion of mistake was discussed earlier, 582 prior to
talking about broad concepts of reliance. 5 3 The typical horse trans-
action was analyzed without rigidly separating the various causes
of action. Mutual mistake was shown to focus on the consciousness
of the buyer, even though mutual mistakes involve two people.
From a discussion of the buyer's reliance, a transition was made
to the consciousness of the seller-especially noting the spectrum
" See the point made at supra notes 120-40 and 545 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (1981).
52 See supra notes 391-98 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 514-61 and accompanying text.
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of circumstances where the standard changes from imputed knowl-
edge to actual knowledge.5 4 It is appropriate, finally, to return to
mistake-to tie the seller's knowledge with the buyer's reliance,
even when the unilateral mistake is made by the buyer. The contract
Restatement view of this subject585 ties this body of law (a) to the
seller's knowledge and buyer's reliance, and (b) back to uncons-
cionability concepts.5 8 6 All these subjects are found in the same
transactions.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 153 begins by noting
that if the buyer "bears the risk of the mistake," then his or her
mistaken impression is no defense or cause for rescissionary re-
lief.58 7 The Restatement adds, however, that a different rule applies
if "the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault
caused the mistake.' '588 This neatly ties back to the rule of Norton,
which this Article suggests is the correct way to analyze most
quality defect situations, at least where the defect comes near to
being a "total" one.58 9 A party's reason to know, of course, must
be analyzed on the facts of each case.
Finally, the same section of Restatement provides that the buyer
wins even if he or she would otherwise "bear the risk of a mis-
take," if the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract
would be "unconscionable. ' ' 590 Unconscionability is more than hav-
ing reason to know, and is to be analyzed as heretofore suggested.
J. A Provisional Conclusion: a Leading Case
Many cases have suggested, usually implicitly, that the courts
do not feel bound by the rigid tests set out in the black letter
authorities for determining whether the buyer or seller wins in a
horse transaction. 91 But Calloway v. Manion 92 is an extraordinary
case, and neatly makes the point about the overlapping of causes
of action in horse cases. In Calloway, a mare had "an incipient
ovary condition ' 593 that caused her to kick repeatedly and to injure
,54 Id.
Iss RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
I" See supra notes 78-119 and accompanying text.
I" RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981).
5" Id.
,0 See supra notes 526-30 and accompanying text.
"' RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 153.
19, See, e.g., McKnight, 449 S.W.2d 706; Norton, 350 F.2d 46.
5- 572 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1978).
591 Id. at 1035.
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her foot. At the time of the sale, the buyer noted the foot's
swelling, but the seller stated that the swelling was "not a prob-
lem," and that he would substitute another horse if it became a
problem. 94 The jury had found all the elements of an implied
warranty of merchantability, but the buyer could not prevail under
that cause of action because of his refusal to inspect, pursuant to
U.C.C. section 2-316(c)(2).5 95
The express warranty regarding the animal's foot was also of
no avail because "in the context of an oral agreement between two
parties knowledgeable in the field," an agreement to substitute
horses in the event of the buyer's dissatisfaction would be construed
as an agreed limitation of remedies, enforceable against the buyer
in the event of the breach of the express warranty. 596 Recognizing
that "a seller attempting to limit his buyer's remedies should do
so in the most specific terms possible, we are unwilling to enforce
the standards that we might apply to a written contract in this
case." 597
The buyer, then, was left with a fraud claim. Noting that the
U.C.C. does not apply to fraud claims, the court nonetheless made
"reference to the Code by analogy in determining the balance of
the equities in the situation," holding that the buyer's use of the
horse, despite his objection to its ovary and foot problems, con-
stituted an "exercise of dominion and control over the mare [such
as to] prevent rescission.''598 Thus, the non-conformity remedies
were not available. The mare had been accepted, and the buyer
could not revoke his acceptance. Only damages were available, as
in the analogous warranty situation.
K. Agency: A Last Reprise
Calloway involved no agents, which is unusual in a horse sale.
The nature of the agency relationship involved in many transactions
can be considered as one of the factors to be taken into account
in determining whether there will be a cause of action for a plaintiff
buyer, and whether circumstances surrounding a contested contract
clause will be determined to be unconscionable. There is no reason
59 Id.
595 Id.
"9 Id. at 1037-38.
"' Id. at 1038.
598 Id.
[VOL.. 78
SALE OF HORSES
that agency matters need to be treated as rigidly as is traditional, 99
in certain marginal situations. For example, in Keck, the seller
actually did not misdescribe the breeding history of the mare whose
sale was set aside because it did not conform to the industry's
understanding of the catalogue description. 6° In fact, one of the
great thoroughbred establishments had been hired to consign the
mare as agent and had reported its breeding history, in perfectly
good faith, in language that the court found to be not in accor-
dance with the understanding of buyers in the industry. 6°1 If the
buyer had been a little slower than the buyer in Keck to discover
the truth, and had returned the mare after its condition had changed
for the worse, it is not impossible that a court would find the
seller's reasonable reliance on the agent farm to act for him or her
to be among all the facts and circumstances to be taken into
account when determining whether the buyer could return the mare
to the seller.
More direct authority is available with respect to whether the
agent's knowledge and notice are binding upon the principal. 602
Take a hypothetical case where the boarding agent of an entirely
inactive limited partnership knew of a slight injury of a weanling
in the field. Assume that the injury lasted for one day, and did
not appear important until an X-ray revealed a healed bone crack
after the colt's sale at auction as a yearling. Did the seller have
reason to know what his or her boarding farm knew? An affirm-
ative answer is given with more assurance if the boarding farm
also acted as agent to consign the yearling for its owner. The
U.C.C. 60 3 and the Restatement (Second) of Agency6 open the gates
at least so far as the principal's notice and knowledge are concerned
to such an analysis. Unfortunately, the U.C.C. limits some of its
broadening language to "organizations" that require "two or more
" See, e.g., R. ANDERSON, supra note 15, at § 2-315:49.
Keck, 413 F. Supp. at 1382.
601 Id.
60 See, e.g., Jeny Alderman Ford Sales, Inc. v. Bailey, 291 N.E.2d 92 (Ind. Ct. App.
1972); Chemico Ind. Applicators Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 366 F. Supp. 278
(E.D. Mo. 1973).
"o See U.C.C. § 1-201(25)-(28) (1988), which, for example, makes the principal liable
for acts of the agent, only if the principal "had not exercised due diligence" in the
circumstances.
60, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 268-283 limit a principal's notice and knowl-
edge according to the "authority" of the agent to receive it, and/or the agent's "duty to
give the principal information."
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persons having a joint or common interest."' ' -5 This definition
presumably excludes a single principal and his or her agent. None-
theless, a broader approach must be taken that takes into account
the facts and circumstances of each case.
- U.C.C. § 1-201(28).
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